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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TRIAL JUDGE
MUST CONVENE COMPETENCY HEARING SUA SPONTE WHEN RECORD
PRODUCES "BONA FIDE" DOUBT AS TO DEFENDANT'S FITNESS To
STAND

TRIAL

NOTWITHSTANDING

THE

ABSENCE

OF

A

REQUEST.

Pate v. Robinson (U.S. 1966)
Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in Illinois. At trial, it was conceded that he had killed his wife, and
his defense rested primarily on a plea of insanity. Although ample evidence
was introduced to indicate a history of pronounced irrational behavior
reflecting on petitioner's past and present mental state, no formal request
was made for a hearing to determine his present competency to stand trial.'
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, petitioner challenged his conviction, claiming that he should have been afforded a hearing to determine
his competency. Reversal was denied on the grounds that petitioner had
failed to request this hearing at trial and that the evidence on the record
was insufficient to require the trial court to convene a competency hearing
on its own motion. 2 A petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The
petition was later granted by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
on a finding that the hasty manner in which the conviction was obtained
prevented the development of all the pertinent facts relating both to petitioner's sanity and competency at time of trial.8 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari 4 and remanded the case to the district court with
directions to release the petitioner unless he were granted a new trial,
holding that when "bona fide" doubt as to a defendant's competency is
apparent from the record, the failure of a trial court to convene a competency hearing on its own motion is reversible error, despite defendant's
failure to request such a hearing. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
1. A request, if made, would have been pursuant to ILL. RXv. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 104-13 (1963).
2. People v. Robinson, 22 Ill.
2d 162, 174 N.E.2d 820 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 995 (1962).
3. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965). The
court also held that when defendant's sanity is in issue, the denial of a reasonable
request to obtain the services of a psychiatric witness istantamount to a suppression
of evidence violative of due process.
4. Pate v. Robinson, 382 U.S. 890 (1965).

(655)
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The paramount issues in the instant case concern a defendant's ability
to waive a competency hearing by failing to request it, and the duty of a
trial judge to convene such a hearing on his own motion. As to the former
issue, a survey of relevant waiver cases indicates a generally accepted view
that significant constitutional guarantees may be waived.5 Whether in
particular situations there may be a waiver usually necessitates reference
to the classic definition of that concept enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst,6
wherein the Court termed it, "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."'7 Indeed, the ability to waive constitutional protections is commonly determined against the backdrop of
the Zerbst standard. Thus, considerations of waiver are frequently coupled
with judicial recognition that a by-passing of safeguards may reflect a
purposeful trial tactic,8 a prerequisite of which - it would seem - is a
competent defendant. Therefore it is reasonable to say that in an atmosphere of questionable competency "where we premise a defendant so deranged that he cannot oversee his lawyers" the concept of waiver is inappropriate. For this reason, the Court in the instant case, after citing
Bishop v. United States ° to explicate that due process requires that a
defendant be competent at time of trial, quickly dispensed with petitioner's
failure to request a competency hearing by saying that a mentally incompetent person cannot intelligently waive such a defense."
The second and more significant issue of the case centers on the
affirmative duty of a trial judge to convene a competency hearing on his
own motion when "bona fide doubt" as to defendant's competency is presented. Competence to stand trial has been defined by the Court as a
defendant's "'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' "12
The test is not identical with that used in determining the sanity or insanity
of defendant at time of the crime. Nevertheless, the terms are used indiscriminately, thereby creating much confusion.' 3 Not only do the definitions
5. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (right to trial by jury) ;
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (privilege against self-incrimination).
6. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

7. Id. at 464.
8. For the effect a deliberate by-passing of state court procedures may have on

federal habeas corpus remedies, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). But for
the effect of mental incompetency on waiver of defenses, see Taylor v. United States,

282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1960).
9. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 388 (1966) (Harlan, J. dissenting).

10. 350 U.S. 961 (1956), reversing 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
11. 383 U.S. at 384.
12. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), reversing 271 F.2d 385 (8th
Cir. 1959).

13. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 n.6 (1966). The Illinois statute now
distinguishes between sanity and competency. Illinois case law had already made such
a distinction. Ibid.
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of sanity and competency differ markedly, but the purposes for which these
defenses are offered are dissimilar. An insanity plea is generally offered
for acquittal whereas a competency plea is offered for postponement of
trial. 14 In fact, a defendant may be insane, but competent, sane, but incompetent, or both insane and incompetent. Evidence offered to prove
one condition, may well be evidence of the other, or at least be sufficient
to raise a "bona fide" doubt as to competency or sanity. 1
The pertinent Illinois statute requires a trial judge to convene a
competency hearing on his own motion where a "bona fide" doubt is presented concerning defendant's competency.' 6 Where the facts or circumstances of a case present such a doubt, an affirmative duty to impanel a
jury and hear evidence as to defendant's competency is imposed upon the
judge.' 7 In such a situation, the critical issue, and one which the Court
did not expressly decide, is how much evidence is required to raise "bona
fide" doubt. The majority found that the evidence presented on petitioner's
mental state both at the commission of the crime and at the time of trial
was of such a nature to raise the requisite "bona fide" doubt concerning
competency.' 8 The divergence of opinion between the majority and minority
revolves around the correct construction to be given the factual situation
as presented from the record. Having examined all evidence relating to
petitioner's bizzare conduct, the Court found that "bona fide doubt" could
not have been dispelled by the lucid demeanor of defendant during trial,
which was exemplified by his "colloquies" with the trial judge.' 9 The
dissent, reading the same record, found that demeanor was very significant,
sufficient, in fact, to bar a disturbance of the trial judge's decision, particularly since defense counsel had not indicated any desire for a post20
ponement of trial.
At first blush, it appears that the Court's decision was predicated on
the existence of the Illinois statute which creates the test of "bona fide"
doubt and mandates the competency inquiry. It is clear that the constitutional infirmity in this case was not the disallowance of the defense of
incompetency, but the failure to make the required inquiry. 2' But the
decision is unclear insofar as it speaks of a constitutional right to have a
competency hearing. The decision seems to indicate, by its emphasis on the
presence of the Illinois statute, that not all state trial judges are required to
convene a competency hearing on their own motions when a "bona fide"
doubt as to competency is presented. Rather, where a state statute mandates
such an inquiry, the failure to comply with the statutory procedure violates
14. Id. at 391 n.5 (Harlan, J. dissenting).

15. Id. at 384 n.6.
16. ILL. RV. STAT. ch. 38, § 102-2 (1963). See People v. De Simons, 28 Ill. 2d
72, 190 N.E.2d 831 (1963) ; People v. Shrake, 25 Ill. 2d 141, 182 N.E.2d 754 (1962).
17. Brown v. People, 8 Ill. 2d 540, 134 N.E.2d 760 (1956).

18.
19.
20.
21.

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966).
Id. at 386.
Id. at 390-91 & n.5 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 388 n.1 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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due process. The test of "bona fide" doubt was created by the statute; as
such, the application of the Court's test is limited to a similar state statute.
Indication of the difficulty with this analysis is presented by a recent
22
District of Columbia Court of Appeals case, Hansford v. United States.
There, a defendant who was addicted to narcotics, testified that he had
been using narcotics throughout the trial. According to earlier psychiatric
testimony, his use of narcotics on past occasions had produced acute brain
syndrome. 23 Based on this testimony and other evidence in the record
of previous narcotics difficulties, the Court of Appeals found that the failure
of the judge to convene a competency hearing violated due process. Principal authority for the court's position was Pate v. Robinson.2 4 The District
of Columbia Code provides for commitment of an incompetent defendant
when such incompetency appears from "the court's own observations, or
from prima facie evidence submitted to the court. '25 Chief Judge Bazelon,
speaking for the majority, read Pate to require the court to convene a
hearing on its own motion, without a defense request, where the issue of
defendant's competency is clouded by his possible narcotic-induced brain
syndrome. 26 Demeanor was clearly ruled out as a factor capable of dissolving the doubt; thus, the statutory discretion of the trial judge is severely
limited. Additionally, the Court of Appeals in Hansford appears to have
raised the requirement of a hearing to constitutional dimensions, even
27
absent a statutory provision for a mandatory hearing.
Looking to the interplay of the two decisions, the fact that the judge's
duty to convene a hearing is not statutorily created in the Hansford case
means that the holding of Pate has been broadened by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. It is, however, possible to reconcile the two
cases by remembering that competency is of great constitutional significance
in the assurance of a fair trial. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly state that the failure to follow the state statutory procedure violated
due process, it is reasonable to say that where competency is in issue, its
importance in protecting the rights of the accused will compel compliance
with the state procedure in order to comport with the national standard of
due process. It then becomes the trial judge's duty to assure himself that
the defendant before him is truly competent to stand trial. By reading
Pate in that light, the Hansford decision follows naturally. Despite the
fact that the District of Columbia Code does not provide for a mandatory
hearing on the issue of competency, the statute does permit a hearing on
22. 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
23. Id. at 922.
24. Id. at 923.
25. D.C. CODZ tit. 24, § 301(a) (1961).
26. Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920, 923-24 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
27. D.C. CODs tit. 24, § 301 (a), does not mandate a hearing on the issue of competency unless the Government or the defendant object to the hospital report on which
the judge must base his finding of incompetency. Consequently, the statutory duty
imposed in the Illinois statute is lacking in Hansford, especially where no challenge
on the issue of competency was made at trial.
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defense objection later in the procedure. 28 Since the Pate case indicated
that a failure to request the statutory hearing because of his possible incompetency 29 would not prejudice the rights of defendant to raise the issue
later, it is not unreasonable to shift the statutory duty from the defense
to the trial judge as the Hansford court has done.
As suggested above, the question left unresolved by both cases is the
quantum of fact necessary to create a bona fide doubt in the trial judge's
mind, i.e., sufficient to require him to convene the competency hearing.
In both cases, there was extensive evidence in the record indicating irrational behavior by defendant in the past either through brain damage 0
or narcotics addiction.31 Also each defendant's demeanor at trial indicated
lucidity and an awareness of the proceedings.32 Despite defendants' apparent lucidity, the majorities of both courts determined that the facts in
evidence could not be overcome by any "apparent" competency, but had
to be tested out in a special competency hearing. How much less evidence
would have sufficed to raise the requisite "bona fide" doubt is not made
clear, nor is it even alluded to by either court.
A further difficulty posed by the Hansford case in this connection is
the use of the test of "bona fide" doubt, created by the Illinois statute, in
construing the duty of the judge under the District of Columbia provision.
The pertinent section of the District of Columbia Code refers to the judge's
"own observations" or "prima facie" evidence submitted to him.3 3 Since
both the Hansford and the Pate courts indicated that personal observation
by the judge will not dispel the doubt created by the record, that part of
the statute has almost been nullified or at least ignored. Since neither case
instructs as to how little evidence is required to meet the standard of "bona
fide" doubt, the judge is best advised to convene a competency hearing
every time some evidence is adduced that might prove incompetency. His
discretion to trust to his own observations is largely removed.
In order to avoid undesirable results from these cases, it might be
better to limit them to their facts. Otherwise, even a scintilla of evidence
relating to defendant's competency or sanity might give rise to a duty on
the part of the trial judge to halt the trial and convene a competency
hearing. Failure to so limit the cases causes the further aspect of defense
counsel's control over his case to pose great difficulties. Since the courts
have indicated that a failure to request a hearing by the defense will not
relieve the judge of his duty to convene the hearing, the defense counsel
cannot retain complete control over the strategic moves that normally result
in the course of a trial. Furthermore, it appears that the Pate court has
effectively imputed the potential incompetency of defendant to his counsel,
28. Ibid.
29. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
30. Id. at 378-80.
31. Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
32. 383 U.S. at 385; 365 F.2d at 924.
33. D.C. COD tit. 24, § 301(a) (1961).
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thereby precluding a voluntary waiver of the right to a competency hearing.
Insofar as defense counsel cannot restrict the evidence which the state may
wish to offer on defendant's mental state, the moment that sufficient evidence
is presented, the judge must convene a competency hearing, irrespective
of defense wishes in the matter. Premising a situation where the accused
is innocent, Pate places him in an ironic position. If he is unable to meet
the test of competency, he stands a good chance of being committed indefinitely to a state institution for the criminally insane until he is fit to
stand trial, even though he is innocent.
Although the Pate case dealt with the failure of the trial judge to
make the appropriate inquiry into defendant's competency, the defense of
incompetency still remains. Consequently, even where no evidence of incompetency is introduced into the record, the defense on appeal may claim
that defendant was incompetent at the time of trial. However, if evidence
amounting to a "bona fide" doubt as to defendant's competency has been
adduced at trial, the judge will have convened a hearing to determine that
issue on his own, thereby preventing the defense of incompetency on
appeal. This latter seems to be the preferred procedure, since the Court
indicated in Pate that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine competency restrospectively. 34 If competency is not raised at trial,
and no hearing is convened at that time, but it is later raised on appeal,
it would seem that a new trial would have to be ordered because of the
restrospectivity of the competency finding. Procedurally, this is undesirable because evidentiary problems abound with respect to proof of past
competency. This is particularly true on appeal when the record will be
the sole basis of decision.
The net result of the Pate case seems to impose an affirmative duty
on the trial judge to assure himself at all costs, where "bona fide" doubt
is produced by the record, of the competency of the accused. This is so
because of the constitutional significance of competency at time of trial.
By failing to indicate clearly whether or not the statute is the sole basis
for its decision, the Court has left open the question of whether a statute
similar to that of Illinois is required before such duty arises. In addition,
the Court's failure to delineate with greater specificity the outlines of "bona
fide" doubt, has left the trial judge to his own imagination to determine
when he is best advised to convene a competency hearing on his own motion.
A cautious man, desirous of preventing trials wasted by the commission of
error, will probably convene such hearings on the basis of minimal evidence on the point.
Miriam L. Gafni
Barney B. Welsh

34. 383 U.S. at 387.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

DUE PROCESS

-

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

REQUIRING UTILITY TO TERMINATE SERVICE UPON NOTICE OF ILLEGAL
USE FROM A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Sokol v. Public Util. Comm'n (Cal. 1966)
Petitioner operated a club which lawfully supplied its members with
predictions, via the telephone, of the respective fleetness of horses running
at local racetracks. The local telephone company summarily terminated
the club's telephone service as a result of advice received from the San
Francisco Chief of Police that the club's telephones were being used in
connection with the illegal practice of bookmaking. Authority for the telephone company's action rested on Decision No. 414151 of the California
Public Utilities Commission which required any communications utility to
summarily terminate service upon receipt of notice from a law enforcement
officer that the service was being used illegally. Petitioner sought restoration of his telephone service by challenging the constitutionality of Decision
No. 41415 before the Public Utilities Commission which affirmed its
previous determination. 2 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of California
reversed, holding, that Decision No. 41415 violates both the state and
federal constitutions to the extent that it sanctions the taking of property
without due process of law. Due process requires that an impartial tribunal
review the bare allegations of a law enforcement official before telephone
service may be terminated. Sokol v. Public Util. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d
418 P.2d 265, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1966).
It is axiomatic that a public utility must serve without discrimination
all members of the public who comply with its reasonable regulations,8
and damages will lie against a utility for its wrongful refusal or discontinuance of service.4 Equally well established is that the duty to provide
service does not extend to services which will be used illegally, 5 and a
reasonable belief that the telephone will be used in furtherance of illegal
activity is adequate cause for refusing or discontinuing service. 6 Further1. The Decision provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny communications utility . . . must discontinue and disconnect service to a
subscriber, whenever it has reasonable cause to believe that the use made . . . is
prohibited under any law, ordinance, regulation, or other legal requirement, or is
being used as an instrumentality . . . to violate or to aid and abet the violations
of the law.
The Decision further provides that receipt of written notice from a duly authorized
law enforcement official will constitute reasonable cause. The utility is immunized
from a damage suit for a wrongful discontinuance. An aggrieved subscriber's exclusive remedy is a proceeding for restoration of service before the Commission.
Decision No. 41415, 47 Cal. P.U.C. 853 (1948).
2. Edgar J. Sokol, Decision No. 69510, Case No. 7784 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
Nov. 20, 1963).
3. State v. Citizens' Tel. Co., 61 S. Car. 83, 39 S.E.2d 257 (1901).
4. Pike v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 So. 2d 254 (Ala. 1955) ; Giordullo
v. Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co., 34 Ohio Op. 251, 71 N.E.2d 858 (C.P. 1946).
5. In the Matter of Delaware Sports Serv., 196 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Super. Ct.
1963), aff'd mem., 202 A.2d 568 (Del. 1964), cert. denied, Delaware Sports Serv. v.
Diamond State Tel. Co., 379 U.S. 965 (1965).
6. Delaware Sports Serv. v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 241 F. Supp. 847 (D.C.
Del. 1965).
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more, a utility that furnishes service in furtherance of an illegal activity
may risk criminal prosecution. 7 Thus, a public utility which receives notice
from the police that a subscriber is using the service illegally may find itself
pinioned between the horns of a dilemma: if the utility refuses to render
service on the unsubstantiated opinion of a law enforcement official it may
be found liable to the subscriber and, at the same time, its refusal to terminate service may result in criminal prosecution. To facilitate law enforcement by encouraging cooperation with police officials, relief has been
afforded the utilities by the courts,8 tariff, 9 statute, 10 and administrative
orders" similar to that of the instant case.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution forbids
a state to take property without due process of law, and telephone service
has recently been reaffirmed as a property right protected by the constitution.' 2 Indeed, even the temporary deprivation of service constitutes a
"taking" of property.' 3 Early cases were fairly unanimous in holding that
telephone service could be summarily discontinued under a statute or
administrative order similar to Decision No. 41415 without resultant liability to the utility even though the beliefs of the law enforcement agency
were subsequently proven to be unfounded. 1 4 Due process requirements
were thought to have been fulfilled by a post termination hearing on the
merits,' 5 at which time the utility normally bore the burden of establishing
that it was justified in refusing to restore service. 10 This was an outgrowth
of a prevalent belief that the subscriber had an adequate remedy against the
law enforcement officials for a wrongful withdrawal of services instigated
7
by them.'
The question of whether notice is required before service may be discontinued was often moot as the utility frequently gave notice as a matter
of practice, even though not required by order or statute, and thus enabled
the subscriber to bring an action in equity to enjoin termination.' 8 Andrews
v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.19 dealt with a tariff provision that re7. Hamilton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ohio 1940);
State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13 N.J. Super. 172, 80 A.2d 342 (1952). See also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 672, 676 (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1702, 1710
(1959).
8. Fogarty v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 251 (D.C. La. 1940):

Haggerty v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 145 Fla. 515, 199 So. 570 (1940). Relief
in these cases took the form of a holding that the utility is justified in discontinuing
service upon receipt of notice from a law enforcement agency.
9. McBride v. Western Union Tel. Co., 171 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Alexander
Presmarita, 98 P.U.R. (n.s.) 140 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1952).
10. See, e.g., TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. art. 652(a), § 5 (1952).
11. See note 1 supra; accord, Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n Order No. 22305 (Dec. 21,

1951).

12. Telephone News Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D.
Ill. 1963), aff'd inem., 376 U.S. 782 (1964).

13. Pacific Tel. v. Eshelman, 166 Cal. 640, 664, 137 Pac. 1119, 1127 (1914).

14. Kaufman, Ex Parte Deprivationof Telephone Service to Alleged Gamblers Police Power v. Constitution, 2 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 9, 37-38 (1953).
15. Dente v. New York Tel. Co., 55 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
16. Feldman v. Wallander, 67 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
17. See, e.g., Sylvia Miller, 97 P.U.R. (n.s.) 223 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comn'n 1952).
18. See, e.g., Fay v. Miller, 183 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
19. 83 F. Supp. 966 (D.C. Md. 1949).
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quired summary discontinuance upon receipt of notice from a law enforcement agency advising the commission of illegal activity. The federal district court was of the opinion, albeit in dictum, that a public utility would
not be justified in summarily terminating service upon an ex parte determination of illegal use of the facility by a law enforcement officer, and a
tariff or administrative order which conferred such judicial power would
be violative of due process. 20 A statutory provision 2' similar to Decision
No. 41415 was before the Delaware Chancery court, under circumstances
similar to Andrews, in Tollin v. Diamond State Tel. Co. 22 and was disposed
of in no uncertain manner: "I have no doubt but that this particular section
is in itself invalid because it purports to permit the cutting off of telephone service without a hearing and to absolve the telephone company
from all liability for damages thereby resulting .... ,,23

In Telephone News Sys. Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,24 the federal
district court, assuming arguendo that the due process question was properly before it, posited that the federal counterpart 25 of Decision No. 41415
was consistent with due process requirements since it provided for reasonable notice of termination and expressly reserved to the subscriber his
equitable remedy to prevent wrongful discontinuance. 26 Although the
statute immunized the utility from a damage suit by an injured subscriber,
the procedure required was thought to guarantee the subscriber a "real
opportunity to protect" his rights since he could promptly bring equitable
proceedings, upon receipt of notice, to enjoin termination pending an
27
adjudication on the merits.
The instant case squarely presents the issue of whether the method
provided by Decision No. 41415 for thwarting allegedly illegal use of
communication service results in depriving the subscriber of due process
of law by failing to provide for notice or an impartial determination of
illegality of use prior to discontinuance of service. Whether action without
prior hearing comports with due process is dependent upon a delicate balance of the needs of the individual against the urgency of immediate action,
especially where there may exist other means effective to combat the evil
sought to be remedied.2 8 Unquestionably, the state has a legitimate interest
in frustrating illegal activity and one of the most effective means of disrupting criminal activities dependent upon telephone communication is the
peremptory termination of such communication.2 9 Recognizing that sum20. Id. at 968; accord, Harry Katz, 92 P.U.R. (n.s.) 1 (F.C.C. 1951).
21. DeL. Cone ANN. tit. 11, § 675 (1953).
22. 164 A.2d 254 (Del. Ch. 1960).
23. Id. at 259.
24. 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill.
1963), aff'd mene., 376 U.S. 782 (1964).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d) (1966).
26. 220 F. Supp. at 635-36 (dictum).
27. Id. at 636.
28. Hough v. McCarthy, 54 Cal. 2d 273, 285, 353 P.2d 276, 284, 5 Cal. Rptr. 668,
676 (1960).
29. Brief for Petitioner, Exh. A, p. 15; See Comment, The Suppression of Bookie
Gambling by a Denial of Telephone and Telegraph Facilities,40 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
176 (1949).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL, 12

mary action is not always prohibited,80 the court weighed this interest of
the state against the indispensability of communication service to a modern
business enterprise and the possibility of fatal damages to a legitimate business that might accrue through a mistaken determination of illegality by
law enforcement officials. Deprivation of free speech rights that could
result from an unbridled use of Decision No. 41415 were also recognized
by the court in arriving at the conclusion that the rights of the subscriber
were not adequately protected by the prescribed procedure.
The holding of Sokol that Decision No. 41415 is unconstitutional is
not as significant as the minimum due process requirement recommended
by the court for incorporation in any new Commission order designed to
combat the same evil as Decision No. 41415. In fact, if the court had been
so inclined it could have corrected the fatal defect of Decision No. 41415,
by invalidating only that provision which immunized the utility from suit
for an unjustified discontinuance of service. 81 However, while preserving
the remedy of the subscriber3 2 and protecting the interest of the state in
the suppression of illegal gambling,8 3 this course would have remitted the
utility to its earlier perilous position.3 4 To rectify the Decision's infirmity
by such a holding would have ignored its admittedly salutary purpose by
condemning what was merely an ill-considered means to achieve that purpose. Another possible tack open to the court was to recommend that
reasonable notice be given to the subscriber before termination. This
expedient could have salvaged the Decision since it would have given a
subscriber an opportunity to secure an injunction restraining termination
of service prior to a judicial determination of the truth of the police allegations.88 But, by the same token, enforcement of such a notice requirement
would enable an actual illegal user to notify his customers and shift his
operations, thereby avoiding the effect of a later termination of service to
his by then abandoned base of operation. This alternative would severely
thwart the interest of the state in surprisedly disrupting the essential communication facilities of the gambling industry and emasculate the effectiveness of such termination. Equally disparaging of the interest of the state
would be a requirement that there be an adjudicative type hearing prior
to discontinuance of service. Such a requirement is not constitutionally
necessary. 86
30. Sokol v. Public Util. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d __ 418 P.2d 265, 269-70, 53 Cal.

Rptr. 673, 677-78 (1966).
31. See note I supra.
32. Pike v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 So. 2d 254 (Ala. 1955).
33. See generally Comment, The Suppression of Bookie Gambling by a Denial
of Telephone and Telegraph Facilities,40 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 176 (1949).
34. Damages for wrongful discontinuance of service on the one hand and possible
criminal prosecution on the other were the alternatives.
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d) (1966).
36. "It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at
some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination." Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950). Accord, Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947) ; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442-43 (1944) ; Bowles
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Instead of choosing one of these approaches, all of which have found
favor in other jurisdictions, the court recommended a novel means of protecting all interests involved. The court reasoned that had the police
desired to search the premises of the petitioner or to seize his property they
would have had to satisfy a magistrate that probable cause existed for the
issuance of a warrant.3 7 Since telephone service is a property right protected by the fourteenth amendment and termination of that service may
be fairly regarded to be a seizure of that property, the court theorized that
the procedure allowing such a seizure should not be radically dissimilar
from that allowing a search of his premises. This analysis led the court
to conclude that standards substantially less exacting than those required
for obtaining a search warrant - proof of reasonableness of the police
allegations before an impartial tribunal prior to the search - could not be
88
constitutionally supported.
It is submitted that the court is correct in positing that due process of
law demands, in these circumstances, a procedure coextensive with that
which prevents police from ignoring the fourth amendment guarantee of
right to privacy. While not enunciated by the court, it is safe to assume
that the substantive requirements of obtaining a search warrant must also
be met and that mere "rubber stamping" of unsupported police allegations
will not be tolerated. 39 The recommended procedure amply protects the
rights and interests of all parties. It is true that the subscriber will not
ordinarily be advised of this proceeding nor will he have an opportunity
to be heard prior to discontinuance, but his rights will be safeguarded
through the review that an impartial tribunal will give of the reasonableness of the police allegations and he will still have an opportunity to
promptly challenge these allegations in an action to restore service. The
interests of the state are equally preserved. Effective suppression of illegal
activity does not require that the police act immediately but only unexpectedly. 40 In only an extraordinary situation could irreparable harm
to society accrue during the time required to secure the requisite authorization. Besides, any resultant loss in time is more than justified by the
protection afforded the subscriber. Finally, assuming that a public utility
acting under an authorized request from a law enforcement agency would
be immunized from suit, 41 the utility would be relieved of its dilemma.
John P. O'Dea
v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589,

596-97 (1931).
37. Sokol v. Public Util. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d

-,
418 P.2d 265, 270, 53 Cal. Rptr.
673, 678 (1966).
38. Id. at
-, 418 P.2d at 271, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) ; Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) ; Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
40. 65 Cal. 2d at __ 418 P.2d at 271, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 679. The court pointed out
that termination of service did not occur until two days after receipt of notice from

the chief of police.
41. See, e.g., Erskine v. Hohnbach, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 613, 616 (1871).
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RATE IS ENTITLED AT TIME OF CONDEMNATION TO "GOING CONCERN
VALUE" IN ADDITION TO REPRODUCTION COST VALUE.

In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. (N.Y. 1966)
Claimants owned and operated within the city of New York two of the
largest privately owned bus lines in the nation. Transit fares were regulated by the city and had been maintained at fifteen cents for several years
despite claimants' protests that their net income had been decreasing rapidly
in the face of rising overhead costs. In 1962 claimants estimated that their
annual losses would exceed six million dollars and sought to have their

basic franchise contract revised to permit a fare increase to twenty cents.
When the city refused to grant the fare increase, claimants made drastic
labor cut-backs resulting in a strike by the transport workers. Shortly thereafter, the city condemned the bus lines and has operated them ever since.1
At trial before the Supreme Court, Special Term, 2 the city valued the
bus lines at 20.7 million dollars, whereas the claimants placed the value
at 92.5 million. The claimants sought compensation for certain going concern assets - routes, schedules, procedures, records, trained personnel
and operating rights - but the trial court refused to make allowance for
them. The court awarded claimants 30.3 million dollars, the "in use" value
of the physical assets measured by their reproduction cost less depreciation.
Both parties appealed the award. The Appellate Division affirmed, one
judge dissenting.3 The Court of Appeals modified the award and remanded the case, holding, in a four to three decision, that claimants had
a right to charge reasonable rates and, because claimants were capable of
profitable operations under a reasonable rate, they were entitled to be compensated for their intangible going concern assets. In re Fifth Ave. Coach
Lines, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 212, 219 N.E.2d 410, 273 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1966).
The most distinctive characteristic of the condemnation of a public
utility or a public service corporation is that it results in not just the taking
of physical property, but in the taking of the entire business itself. Recognizing this, the courts have required the condemning government to pay
not merely for the value of the physical property, but for the value of the
business, as a functioning entity, itself. 4 This added measure of compensa1. A fascinating and detailed report of the events leading up to the condemnation is contained in the city's brief to the Court of Appeals. Brief for Respondent,
pp. 15-34, In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 212, 219 N.E.2d 410, 273
N.Y.S.2d 52 (1966).
2. In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 46 Misc.2d 14, 259 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup.
Ct. 1964).
3. In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 23 App. Div.2d 463, 261 N.Y.S.2d 784
(1965).
4. Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 539-40, 148 N.E. 668, 670 (1925).
For complete discussions see, 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OP PROPERTY 432-36 (1937)
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tion is usually in the form of what is called "going concern value." Defined
in this context, "going concern value" is the difference between the value
of an established, integrated and efficient business and the value of an
identical business that has not yet begun to function as such. 5 It has generally been stated by the writers 6 and the cases 7 that the condemned public
service corporation must be a profitable enterprise in order to receive compensation for going concern value. One explanation as to why only a
profitable business qualifies for this extra measure of damages is that the
value of the business - for purposes of condemnation payments - is
measured by the fair market value, or that price a willing purchaser would
pay for the business in the open market 8 If the business is not earning
reasonable profits, no such hypothetical purchaser would be likely to pay
more than scrap value9 for it.1'
When going concern value is to be awarded, the methods used by the
tribunals to evaluate this intangible asset have varied, depending upon the
evaluator's fundamental conception of what going value is. According to
one writer in this field," the cases reveal two wholly different concepts
of going concern value. One group of cases deals with going value as a
form of overhead cost which is to be but generally considered in arriving
at the value of the business measured by the cost of duplicating the entire
operation as it is at the time of taking.' 2 Thus going value is the estimated
[hereinafter cited as

BONBRIGHT] ; 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER TH LAW op EmINENT
58-60 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGEL].
5. 2 BONBRIGHT 1147; see, e.g., Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,

DOMAIN

154 Wisc. 121, 142 N.W. 476, 484 (1913).
6. 2 BONBRIGHT 1146-47; 2 ORGEL 125, 141; WHI'TN, VALUATION OF PUBLIC
SERVICE CORPORATIONS 558 (1912); Potter, Going Value, 24 MICH. L. Rxv. 232,

246-47 (1926).

7. Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915) ; United
States v. Boston C.C. & N.Y. Canal Co., 271 Fed. 877, 897 (1st Cir. 1921) ; Kennebec
Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 208, 54 Atl. 6, 15 (1902); In re Sixth
Ave. Elevated R.R., 265 App. Div. 200, 206, 38 N.Y.S.2d 730, 737 (1942); Re City of
Oroville, 1922E P.U.R. 451, 461 (Calif. R.R. Comm'n 1922).
8. "It is usually said that market value is what a willing buyer would pay in

cash to a willing seller." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). Of
course, utilities are not actively dealt in, so there is usually no market to which a court

could look to find a current price of similar property. The result is that courts and

commissions must dispense with the standards usually denoted by the terms "willing
buyer" and "willing seller" and instead measure the worth of the property by its
value to the owner. Montgomery County v. Schuylkill Bridge Co., 110 Pa. 54, 59,
20 Atl. 407, 408 (1885). "Value to the owner" is in turn measured by the value of the
various tangible and intangible assets estimated usually by their original or reproduction cost. See 2 ORGEL 65-67, 79.
9. "Scrap value" is popularly used to cover any kind of sale of an asset made
after its useful service life has expired. 1 BON3RIGHT 201.

10. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 9 (1949).

See Roberts

v. City of New York, 295 U.S. 264, 282 (1935), where Justice Cardozo made his oft-

quoted remark, "Substantial prices are not paid for the privilege of conducting a
business at a loss." Cf. 2 ORGL. 125.
11. 2 ORGL 37; see also 2 BONBRIGHT 1148.
12. Many courts refuse to compensate the condemned utility for the costs of
developing routes, trained personnel, and records on the grounds that these costs were
written off the books as operating expenses. Therefore, if the corporation has received
a fair return on its investment from its inception, these expenses have been shifted to
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cost of organizing the assets into an integrated, functioning unit with an
established business, and is somehow included in a way not usually articulated in the cost of reproduction figure. A leading case expressing this
view is Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,18 in which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, on the subject of measuring going value, said:
It is not obtained by adding up a number of separate items, but by
taking a comprehensive view of each and all of the elements of property, tangible and intangible, including property rights, and considering them all, not as separate things, but as inseparable parts of one
harmonious entity, and exercising the judgment as to the value of
that entity. In this way the going value goes into the final result, but
it would be difficult for14 even an expert to say how many dollars of
the result represent it.

Such "lump-sum" awards - as they are called - have been upheld
many times by the United States Supreme Court, particularly in "rate
cases."' 15 In Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines,1 exclusion by the
master of a particular item offered as an element of going concern value was
approved because he had valued the physical property on the basis of a
plant in successful operation. In Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Util.
Comn'n,17 the Court affirmed the award saying:
Going value was excluded both by court and by commission as an
item of property to be separately appraised and separately reported.
The record justifies a holding that it was reflected in the other items
and particularly in:
the appraisal of. the physical assets as part of an
assembled whole. .

.

. This, we think, was adequate.' 8

the rate-paying public and the corporation has already been reimbursed. New York
Tel. Co. v. Prendergast, 36 F.2d 54, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) ; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 187 La. 137, 174 So. 180 (1937) ; People ex rel. Kings
County Lighting Co. v. Willcox, 210 N.Y. 479, 489, 104 N.E. 911, 913 (1914) ; City
of Medford, 43 P.U.R. (n.s.) 506, 512-13 (Wisc. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1942).
13. 154 Wisc. 121, 142 N.W. 476,(1913).
14. Id. at 128, 142 N.W. at 48485. Cf. Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y.
533, 544-45, 148 N.E. 668,.672 (1925).
15. In a rate case, the purpose of valuating the utility property is to establish a
base value from which a rate may be determined which will give the utility a reasonable return on its capital -investment This purpose distinguishes rate cases from
eminent domain cases, but it is far. from clear whether this distinction has any
practical importance. While the writers in the field point out several theoretical
differences between the two types of valuation and their effects on the final figure
arrived at (1 BONBRIGHT 436-40; 2 BONBRIGHT 1147; 2 ORGEL 78; WHITN, op Cit.
supra note 1, at 14), in pracfice 'the courts do not generally distinguish the purposes
and cite both rate and condemnation cases quite indiscriminately when referring to
public utility going concern 'valuation. In People ex rel. Kings County Lighting Co.
v. Willcox, 210 N.Y. 479, 486, 104 N.E. 911, 912 (1914), the court expressly rejected
any difference in method when valuating going value for one purpose or the other.
16. 238 U.S. 153 (1915).
17. 292 U.S. 398 (1934).
18. Id. at 411. Accord, Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 292
U.S. 290 (1934); Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287
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According to the other view, going concern value is to be treated as a
distinct intangible asset, valued and awarded separately and in addition
to the reproduction cost figure.' 9 Thus, in InternationalRy. Co. v. Prendergast,20 the court stated:
In obtaining reproduction cost new, the value of the business as complete and ready to begin operation is ascertained. There must be
added a going value, the value of the plant, not as it is ready to begin
operation, but the additional value which accrues because the plant
is in operation .... 21
In the instant case, Special Term found that Claimants were incapable
of profitable operations at the present rate.22 However, it rejected the city's
contention that claimants were therefore entitled only to scrap or "bare
bones" value28 and proceeded to award claimants 'the cost of reproducing
the physical assets. The court reasoned that since the city continued to
operate the bus lines, the bus service was still serving a useful purpose, and
consequently the property must be valued as "property in use." The court
distinguished this from junk value by assigning an indefinite "full going
1933) ; City & County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.s. 178 (1918);

edar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655 (1912).
One commentator has characterized this method of valuation as "an empiric

approximation ...

that ...

represents a compromise between the economic concept

of value, judicial notions of fairness and legal rules of evidence." 2 ORGEL 80. In
Lewis, Going Value and Rate Valuation, 26 Mlcn. L. Rzv. 713, 736 (1928), the author
criticizes "lump sum" valuation stating:
[I]f ... going value for rate purposes cannot be supported on any positive basis,
there seems to be little justification either for throwing in an indefinite amount
merely for good measure, or for . . . appearing to approve of going value while
in reality rejecting the claims made in its behalf.
19. However, this value, arising as it does from the fact that a hypothetical purchaser would pay more for a "live" plant than a "dead" one, is not generally attributed
to the reproduction cost of any specific intangible asset although a definite sum is
fixed by the appraiser. This figure, representing going value, is usually an arbitrary
percentage of the value of the physical assets measured at reproduction cost. See
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 414 (1926) ; City of Minneapolis
v. Rand, 285 Fed. 818, 830 (8th Cir. 1923) ; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City & County
of San Francisco, 273 Fed. 937, 940-41 (N.D. Cal. 1921); Missouri So. Pub. Serv.
Co., P.U.R. (n.s.) 269, 284-86 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1934); Brookville v. Brookville Elect. Co., P.U.R. 1922D 1, 7 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1922).
20. 1 F. Supp. 623 (W.D.N.Y. 1932).
21. Id. at 629. (Emphasis added.) Accord, City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co.,
218 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1910) ; National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. 853,
865 (8th Cir. 1894); Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 208,
54 Atl. 6, 15 (1902); People ex rel. Kings County Lighting Co. v. Willcox, 210 N.Y.
479, 492, 104 N.E. 911, 914 (1914). In one of the more recent cases in this field,
Onondaga County Water Authority v. New York Water Serv. Corp., 285 App. Div.
655, 139 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1955), the court, commenting on reproduction cost as a
method of valuation in condemnation cases, stated: "The chief objection to this
approach is that, used exclusively, it cannot value the intangible factors. .... " Id. at
662, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 763. See also In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d
463, 468, 261 N.Y.S.2d 784, 789 (1965) (Rabin, J., dissenting).
22. 46 Misc.2d at 25, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
23. Id. at 26, 32, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 328, 334. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 115-45,
It re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 212, 219 N.E.2d 410, 273 N.Y.S.2d 52
(1966).
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value" to the tangible assets despite the lack of earning capacity. 24 Moreover, the court refused to allow a separate and additional valuation for
claimants' specific going concern assets, including coach routes, operating
schedules, systems, records and procedures, trained personnel, garage and
shop layout and operating rights.25 Thus, the award by Special Term of
the reproduction cost new less depreciation of the physical assets viewed
"in use" was of the "lump sum" type discussed above, normally awarded
26
only to profitable utilities.
The Court of Appeals rejected this method of valuation and, in effect,
adopted the other concept of going concern value. The court defined
"going concern value" as "the component of value in the business which
in addition to the value of the tangible assets reflects an efficient operation. ' ' 27 In accordance with this view of going value, the court held that
the award by the lower court of reproduction cost was sufficient only to
compensate the claimants for their physical assets.2 8
The higher court also disagreed with Special Term as to claimants'
capability of earning a profit. The court adopted the claimants' position 29
that the city was obligated to permit them to charge a reasonable fare, that
the current fifteen cents rate was unreasonable, and that under a reasonable
fare they were capable of profitable operations." ° Consequently, the court
24. There is but meager authority for such an allowance where the utility has
been found unprofitable. See 1 BONBRIGaT 440-44; 2 ORGEL 141-45. Indeed, the
precedents cited by the Special Term in support of its action, Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) ; City of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246
U.S. 178, 190-91 (1918), and City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 202
(1910), are of doubtful authority since each case dealt with a profitable business.
25. 46 Misc.2d at 26, 29, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 328, 331. The court ruled that these
"expenses" were not elements of going concern value "in this case," apparently on
the grounds that claimants' businesses were unprofitable: "[T]he expenditures to
which it is sought [by the claimants] to assign a value must have resulted in earning
money." Id. at 30, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 332. Thus claimants seemingly would have
received some compensation for these intangible assets if they were earning money.
Whether in such a case Special Term would have assigned a separate and specific
value to each item or would have lumped them into the reproduction cost figure
is unclear.
26. In reviewing the award, the Appellate Division, while noting that the valuation of the physical assets was somewhat "overgenerous," held it to be essentially fair
and recognized that the excess was correctly attributable to claimants' intangible "in
use" value. 23 App. Div. at 466-67, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
27. 18 N.Y.2d at 220, 219 N.E.2d at 413, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (1966).
added.)

(Emphasis

28. See cases cited at notes 19 & 21 supra. The Court of Appeals appears to
have ignored the fact that the lower court purposely inflated its valuation of the
physical property to allow for going or "in use" value.
29. Brief for Appellant, pp. 7-25, 46-58.
30. The lower court rejected these contentions on the grounds that the city had
made a legitimate political decision in the public interest to maintain the fare of fifteen
cents and that it was economically impossible for the claimants to raise their fare
and make profits because roughly 65% of claimants' bus lines was in competition with
the city-owned rapid-transit system which maintained a fare of fifteen cents. Thus, if
claimants had raised their fares, they would have lost all of their passengers to the
subway. 46 Misc.2d 14, 21-23, 259 N.Y.S.2d 313, 323-25 (1964).
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held that the claimants were entitled to compensation for the routes, schedules, systems and other intangible assets not valuated or awarded below. 3'
As discussed above,3 2 the Court of Appeals defined "going concern
value" as an element of value of the business to be added to the value of
the physical property. Consequently, the case was remanded for a determination of the value of those going concern assets rejected below as an
addition to the amount previously awarded. 3 It may be surmised from
this that the court has rejected "lump sum" condemnation awards and
seeks to have the intangible going value separately and specifically valued
4
and reported.
It is submitted that the majority properly rejected the trial court's
method of valuing and awarding going value. To award going value solely
by giving due consideration to the fact that the physical property is "in
use" and will be continued "in use" after the taking is just but, at best,
imprecise. Imprecision too often leads to inaccuracy. Under this method,
inaccuracies by lower tribunals would be hard to detect on appeal, and
then only impressionistically. Undoubtedly, going concern valuation is a
difficult task, made even more so by the fact that invariably the estimates
of going value submitted by the condemnee and the condemnor are grossly
distorted to favor their respective sides. However, this should not justify
following the line of least resistance. The method this decision illustrates
seems to have the advantage of being somewhat more concrete and rational.

It is true that going concern value is incapable of definite measurement,
but if specific values are assigned to specific intangible assets, courts of
last resort will be aided in their review of condemnation awards and be
better able to determine whether the condemnee was justly compensated
for his property.8 5
Frederick C. Moss
31.
profits,
caused
N.Y2d

In support of its finding that the transit companies were capable of earning
the Court of Appeals pointed out that in the past, fare increases by claimants
an increase in its revenue and only a small decrease in its passengers. 18
at 221, 219 N.E.2d at 413, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 56.

32. See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
33. An interesting but presently unanswerable question raised by this case is
whether the Court of Appeals would have affirmed the "lump sum" award, including
the undefined amount awarded for "in use" value, if they also had found the claimants
to be incapable of profitable operations.
34. While there is authority for a separate valuation of going value (see cases
cited notes 19 and 21 supra), there is virtually no precedent for requiring estimates of
the duplication value of routes, records, procedures, personnel and the like. Claimants'
brief to the Court of Appeals cited no authority for such action. Brief for Appellant,
pp. 29-37. In International Ry. v. Prendergast, 1 F. Supp. 623 (W.D.N.Y. 1932),
a rate case, the court stated (at 629) that these items were "the factors of going
value," but then separately valued them at 10% of the value of the physical assets.
The cost of reproducing personnel and records was flatly rejected as an element of
going value in Northern States Power Co., 55 P.U.R. (n.s.) 257, 265 (N.D. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1944) and Syracuse Lighting Co., 30 P.U.R. (n.s.) 385, 460 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1939).
35. "Had the Secretary seen fit to value going concern value as a separate item,
it would have been more accurate and simplified our task." Denver Union Stock Yard
Co. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 83, 89 (D. Colo. 1937).
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INDISPENSABLE PARTY DOCTRINE DECLARED TO BE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
AND UNAMENABLE

TO ALTERATION

BY A PROCEDURAL

RULE.

Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co. (3d Cir. 1966)
Plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of an automobile accident
victim, recovered a default judgment against the estate of the driver of
the car in which the plaintiff's decedent had been riding. Defendant insured
the owner of the car under a policy which extended coverage to persons
driving with the owner's permission, and it was plaintiff's contention that
the driver was operating the car within the scope of the owner's consent
at the time of the accident. After defendant's refusal to defend in the action
brought against the estate of the driver, plaintiff commenced the present
diversity suit for a declaratory judgment that the driver was an insured
within the terms of the policy. Two other victims of the same accident,
who were plaintiffs in pending state actions against the car's owner for
related injuries, were joined as plaintiffs in the present suit, but the owner
himself was not joined as a defendant. The district court rendered the
declaratory judgment requested. On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated
and remanded, holding, after having raised the issue sua sponte, that the
car's owner was an indispensable party in whose absence the suit must
be dismissed. 1 The court declared that the indispensable party doctrine,
as delineated in Shields v. Barrow2 and its progeny, is substantive law
which accords a party whose interests may be affected by the outcome of
an action a substantive right to be joined. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure cannot, consistent with the Federal Rules Enabling
Act,8 effect any alteration in the standards by which the existence of an
indispensable party is determined. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.
granted, 87 S.Ct. 972 (1967).
Rule 19, as it existed prior to a recent amendment, incorporated the
phrase "indispensable parties" but, because of the draftsmen's failure to
define its meaning, was deemed merely declarative of existing decisional
law specifying the standards for determining indispensability. 4 For the
1. The car owner's insurance policy with defendant set finite limits on the
amount payable for claims arising out of the same accident. The court reasoned that
since a judgment against the insurer in the present action would deplete the fund
available for the owner's own protection in the pending state actions, his interests
would be so affected by the decree as to make him an indispensable party.
In an alternative holding, it was found that the lower court should have
exercised its discretion to deny a declaratory judgment in the present action since
the two pending suits in the state court, in which the car owner and all the persons
involved in the accident were parties, would have effectively decided the question as
to the coverage of the policy.
2. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
4. Kuchenig v. California Co., 350 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 985 (1966) ; Stumpf v. Fidelity Gas Co., 294 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1961) ;
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most part,5 the precedent cited by federal courts in specification of these
standards was derived from Shields v. Barrow.6 In the instant case, the
majority acted upon the assumption that former rule 19 was applicable 7
and, consequently, did not consider the amended rule. It is believed, however, that the principal significance of the decision is to be found in its
bearing upon the new rule 19.8
The precise extent of the changes wrought by new rule 19 is uncertain.
On the one hand, it has been said that amended rule 19(b) merely codifies
the equitable standards which courts have considered in the past in determining whether an absent party is indispensable.9 This implies that the
new rule merely clarifies, rather than changes, the indispensability doctrine
laid down by Shields v. Barrow and subsequent cases. If so, the instant
decision would present no threat to the validity of the new rule. Rather,
in its failure to reason in terms of these standards in arriving at the determination of indispensability, the instant decision would represent no more
than another erroneous application of old rule 19.10
There is strong reason to believe, however, that amended rule 19,
unlike its predecessor, affords the district courts sufficient discretion to
proceed with a suit even absent a party who would have been indispensable
Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 1946) ; 3 MooRZ,

PRAcricx ff 19.05[1], at 2144 (2d ed. 1966) ; Note, Indispensable Parties in
the Federal Courts, 65 HARv. L. Rnv. 1050, 1051 (1952).
5. But see notes 43, 44 infra and accompanying text.
6. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854). The Court defined indispensable parties as:
Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy but an interest of such a
nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or
leaving the controversy, in such a condition that its final termination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
Id. at 139.
7. The dissent argued that amended rule 19 was applicable since the appeal was
pending on July 1, 1966, the effective date of the amendment. 365 F.2d at 822 (dissenting opinion).
8. FZD. R. CIv. P. 19, which reads in applicable part:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest ...
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person
as described in subdivision (a) (1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court
include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might
be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures,
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
9. See Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204,
1211 (1966) ; Note, 50 IowA L. Rv. 1135, 1148 (1965).
10. 80 HARV. L. Rpv. 678, 681-82 (1967).
FEDERAL
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under the Shields v. Barrow doctrine. 1 Under the new rule, the class of
individuals defined as "persons to be joined if feasible"' 12 includes those
who, under former standards, would have been termed indispensable. 13 If
joinder of a party thus defined is impossible, dismissal is no longer automatic. Rather, the court, guided by specified equitable criteria, shall determine whether the action should proceed in his absence. 14 If not, the party
is termed "indispensable," but only in a conclusory sense.' 5 Thus, to the
extent that amended rule 19 makes discretionary any joinder which was
formerly mandatory, the instant decision has, in its holding that the indispensable party doctrine of Shields v. Barrow confers a substantive right
to joinder, augured a future finding that the new rule exceeds the scope
of its authoritative source, 16 the Enabling Act, which provides that the
rules "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. ... .17
As the majority concedes,' 8 its contention that the indispensability
doctrine attains the status of substantive law is novel. Existing precedent
offers no direct support for the proposition.' 9 Since the majority has failed
to clarify the precise bases for its holding, it becomes necessary to speculate
concerning the probable grounds for the decision.
In the dissent's view, 20 the majority holding is premised upon the
traditional argument employed by courts disfavoring inclusion of the
element of discretion in the determination of indispensability - the so-called
jurisdictional argument. A significant number of federal cases can be
found which appear to regard the absence of an indispensable party as a
factor depriving the court of jurisdiction or power to adjudicate, even as
between the parties before it,21 in spite of the fact that Shields v. Barrow
supports no such conclusion. 22 The effect of the jurisdictional argument
is to render any liberalization of the indispensability concept under the guise
of procedural reform a jurisdictional change, beyond the scope of the
Enabling Act,28 and prohibited by the specific terms of rule 82.24
11. Fink, Indispensable Partiesand the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19,
L.J. 403, 423-24 (1965). See 2 BARRON & HOLTZoIrp, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 512 (rev. ed. Wright Supp. 1966, at 26).
12. See note 8 supra.
13. 2 BARRON & HoLTZOFi, op. cit. supra note 11, at 25-26; Fink, supra note 11,
at 423.
14. See note 8 supra.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 88, 93 (1966).
16. See 2 BARRON & HOLTZOI:I, op. cit. supra note 11, at 26 n.21.14; Note, 50
IOWA L. Rev. 1135, 1150-52 (1965).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
18. 365 F.2d at 806.
19. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOV9, op. cit. supra note 11, at 26 n.21.14. But see Stevens
v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.7 (1st Cir. 1964).
20. 365 F.2d at 817 (dissenting opinion).
21. E.g., Cameron v. M'Roberts, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 591 (1818) ; Stroud v.
Benson, 254 F.2d 448, 453 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817 (1958); Caldwell
Mfg. Co. v. Unique Balance Co., 18 F.R.D. 258, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
22. Fink, supra note 11, at 416.
23. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.01, at 111 (1966); Note, 50
IOWA L. REv. 1135, 1150 (1965).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 82, which provides: "These rules shall not be construed to

74
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extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts. ..
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The "jurisdictional" language in many of these cases, however, is
readily explicable upon other grounds. 25 With respect to those remaining
cases which cannot be explained away, it is sufficient to indicate that today
the jurisdictional argument stands almost totally discredited. 26 Thus, historical investigation has shown that present compulsory joinder precepts
find their genesis in early equity rules under which all third parties materially interested in the subject matter of the litigation were regarded as
merely "necessary," and hence dispensable if joinder were impossible or
impracticable. The indispensability concept was a later development arising
somewhat anomalously out of equity's obsession with the idea that unless
a court could completely dispose of the entire controversy in one suit, it
should decline to decide the case at all. 27 Therefore, since "the concept
of indispensability . . . was to a large extent self-imposed as a limitation

upon federal equity jurisdiction," 28 the view that the absence of an indispensable party deprives the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the case
before it seems inexplicable in terms of the historical development of the
rule. Moreover, as recent commentary 29 has indicated, the jurisdictional
argument lacks even logical consistency. In the absence of an indispensable
party, the court, to be sure, cannot exercise jurisdiction over him or bind
him by its decree. But the court clearly does have jurisdiction over the
parties actually before it, and the indispensable party's absence cannot
logically be said to deprive the court of its power to render a judgment
affecting only their interests - assuming such can be done.
The authorities relied upon by the majority, however, indicate that,
contrary to the dissent's assumption, it rejected the jurisdictional argument and placed primary emphasis upon the nebulous language in some
of the cases to the effect that failure to join a Shields v. Barrow indispensable party is a more basic "fatal error."80 For the most part,3 ' federal
25. Thus, a critical examination of the language in question, as employed in a
number of diversity cases, reveals that it relates not to the court's lack of jurisdiction
in the absence of an indispensable party, but rather to a lack of diversity of citizenship
that would arise if the indispensable party were joined. By this it is meant that there
would be no subject matter jurisdiction if the indispensable party were joined as he
should have been. Fink, supra note 11, at 416 n.53. For other suggested explanations
of the jurisdictional language in some of the cases cited in support of the jurisdictional
argument, see F41. R. CIv. P. 19, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 88, 90
(1966); Cohn, supra note 9, at 1206; Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil
Actions, 55 MICH. L. Rgv. 327, 348 n.70 (1957).
26. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 166 (1825); Standard Oil
Co. v. Marshall, 265 F.2d 46, 56 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Olson v. Miller, 263 F.2d 738, 740
(D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Hudson v. Newell, 172 F.2d 848, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1936) ; Cohn, supra note 9, at
1210; Note, 50 IOWA L. Rgv. 1135, 1150 (1965).
27. Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. Riv. 1254 (1961) ; Comment, 38 So. CAL. L. Rgv. 80, 81 (1965).
28. Developments in the Law - Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,
71 HARv. L. Riv. 874, 888 (1958).
29. 2 BARRON & HoLTzovr, FxDHRAL PRAC'ICIc AND PROC4DURg § 516, at 163
(rev. ed. Wright 1961) ; Reed, supra note 25, at 332-34.
30. E.g., Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1936).
31. Several federal decisions, however, can be summoned in support of the
proposition that the indispensable party doctrine is not an inflexible rule but is one
self-imposed by the court and susceptible to modification, at the court's discretion,
in the interests of justice. See, e.g., Mallow v. Hinde, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193, 197
(1827) ; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 166-67 (1825) ; Gauss v.
Kirk, 198 F.2d 83, 85 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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courts have always regarded the indispensability doctrine as a mandatory
rather than discretionary rule of law, necessitating dismissal in the absence
of compliance.8 2 One possible interpretation of this apparently broader
basis for the decision is that, in the majority's view, considerations of due
process prohibit maintenance of a suit in the absence of a party indispensable under traditional standards.88 If in fact, this was the court's
reasoning, its conclusion finds negligible support. The Supreme Court, it
is true, has implied that, under compelling circumstances, the failure to
join such a party might amount to a denial of due process, 3 4 but this
implication hardly elevates the indispensability concept of Shields v. Barrow
to a rule of constitutional law. The new formulation of the indispensability
principle upon which amended rule 19 is predicated takes full cognizance
of the fact that the decision as to whether to proceed in an interested
party's absence must be made with due process considerations in mind.85
The protective provisions of amended rule 19(b) 8 6 are sufficiently clear
to insure that, properly applied, the rule will not operate to deprive a
87
person of any constitutional right to joinder he may have.
Rather, the most probable explanation of the instant decision appears
to be that the majority implicitly fell prey to the reasoning, heretofore
expressed by at least one commentator,88 that the mandatory, non-discretionary treatment accorded the indispensability doctrine by the courts invites the conclusion that it is, if not a rule of constitutional or jurisdictional
dimension, at least a rule of substantive law. However, the statement that
the courts have tended to treat the indispensability doctrine in such a
manner appears to beg the question of whether, considered apart from its
mode of application, the doctrine is substantive or procedural in nature.
It is submitted that the instant court's own fatal error is to be found in its
failure to analyze the indispensable party rule in terms of the substantiveprocedural dichotomy necessitated by the Enabling Act.
Such an analysis is admittedly difficult, since "substantive" and "procedural" are chameleon-like terms, incapable of precise definition. 39 Of
32. Fink, supra note 11, at 433.
33. 80 HARV. L. Rgv. 678, 682 (1967).
34. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), in which
proceedings were brought by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in its courts to
escheat certain obligations due Western Union, which were potentially subject to
escheat in several states. The Supreme Court held that a judgment of escheat which
did not protect Western Union from claims which might be asserted by other states
violated due process. Since Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction to join the other states

involved, which were presumably indispensable parties, no such protection could
be afforded.
35. See Reed, supra note 25, at 336.
36. See note 8 supra.

37. 80 HARv. L. Rlv. 678, 682-83 (1967).
38. Fink, supra note 11, at 429-31.

39. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), the Supreme Court did
attempt to formulate a threshold definition of what constitutes procedure for purposes
of the Enabling Act, defining it as "the judicial process for enforcing rights and

duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them." It is now recognized, however, that the distinction between substance and procedure is incapable of precise delineation. See, e.g.,
Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand Procedure: A Study in Judicial Rule Making,

55 MicH. L. RAv. 623, 634-35 (1957).
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some assistance, however, are the decisions involving the status of the
indispensability principle as substantive law or procedural rule within the
doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.40 The substantive-procedural boundaries
delineated for purposes of the Erie doctrine are clearly not conclusive of
those prevailing under the Enabling Act. 41 Nevertheless, it is felt that the
Erie-based decisions in this area offer an explanation of the indispensability
concept which tends to support its classification as procedural for Enabling
Act purposes. The decisions in question have not been a model of clarity.
Some cases have simply held, without significant explanation, that the
determination of whether a party is indispensable is a procedural matter
to be decided in accordance with federal law. 42 Other courts, showing
greater insight, have reasoned, without reliance upon the outcome-determinative test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 48 that since the rights and
interests of persons in the subject matter of a diversity suit are created by
state substantive law, state law should also prevail in determining which
parties must be joined. 44 The correct solution to the problem, however,
has been shown to be midway between the two extremes represented by
these cases: "[S]tate law determines the nature of the interest a party has
in a controversy, while the rules and federal decisions construing them
control in determining whether a particular interest, found to exist under
state law, should cause the party to be classified as indispensable. .... -4.
This solution, adopted in a number of better reasoned cases, 46 regards as
a strictly procedural function the task of fashioning standards for courts
to apply in determining whether a given party, with a predetermined
interest in the dispute, must be joined.
The result should be no different when it comes to determining whether
the indispensability principle is substantive or procedural for purposes of
40. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

41. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-72 (1965).
42. E.g., Resnik v. LaPaz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814, 819 (4th Cir. 1961);
Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co., 183 F.2d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 1950) ; DeKorwin v.
First Nat'l Bank, 156 F.2d 858, 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946);
Fremon v. W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co., Ill F. Supp. 39, 49 (S.D. Iowa 1953), aff'd,
209 F.2d 627 (1954) ; Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 472, 474 (E.D. Ill. 1941) ; Simon
v. Shaffer, 11 F. Supp. 450, 452 (N.D. Okla. 1935).
43. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In Kuchenig v. California Co., 350 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 985 (1966), the court relied upon the York test to apply
state law on the question of indispensability, reasoning that where federal standards
would permit maintenance of a suit in the absence of a party deemed indispensable
under state law, the result would be outcome-determinative. Because rule 19 now
covers the question of indispensability, the validity of the Kuchenig reasoning is uncertain when one considers the sanctity afforded the federal rules by Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965). See Kalodner & Price, Federal Jurisdictionand Practice, ANN.
SURVEY AM. L. 307 (1965).
In any event, the reasoning appears, by its very reliance
upon the outcome-determinative principle, to assume that the question of indispensability is a procedural, rather than substantive, matter.
44. E.g., Dunham v. Robertson, 198 F.2d 316, 319 (10th Cir. 1952); Kroese v.
General Steel Casting Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 761 n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
983 (1950); Richmond Lace Works, Inc. v. Epstein, 31 F.R.D. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) ; Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387, 391 (D. Me. 1951).
45. WRIGHT, FED5RAL CouRTs 260 (1963). See Reed, supra note 25, at 517;
Note, 50 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1151-52 (1965).
46. E.g., Hertz v. Record Publishing Co., 219 F.2d 397, 399-400 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 912 (1955) ; Baker v. Dale, 123 F. Supp. 364, 367 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
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the Enabling Act. A rule prescribing what parties are required to be joined
is designed, at least in part, to facilitate the orderly dispatch of judicial
business and, in this sense, is clearly procedural and within the rule-making
power. 47 Moreover, the view, expressed in at least some of the decisions 48
and seemingly confirmed by historical analysis, 49 that the indispensable
party rule is essentially a court-made standard, subject to discretionary
modification in the interests of justice, appears to point to the procedural,
rather than substantive, character of the rule. 50 These considerations tend
to show that the indispensability principle is, if not clearly, at least arguably
procedural in nature. After Hanna v. Plumer,51 however, there can be no
doubt that it is within the scope of the Enabling Act "to regulate matters
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." 52 Since the
indispensability concept is "rationally capable of classification as" procedural, it follows that if amended rule 19 permits any liberalization of
the Shields v. Barrow indispensable party doctrine, it is in permissible
furtherance of the Enabling Act and not, as the instant case suggests, in
violation thereof.
As a final point, it may be noted parenthetically that acceptance of
the majority's premise points to an anomaly within the instant decision.
For once it is assumed that the indispensable party principle is substantive
law for purposes of the Enabling Act, the conclusion is inescapable that
it is also substantive law for purposes of the Erie doctrine.3 Therefore,
unless the majority is prepared to sustain the doubtful proposition that the
indispensability principle of Shields v. Barrow is a rule of constitutional
law, 54 the Erie doctrine would seem to dictate application of state joinder
rules in a diversity suit, rather than federal indispensability standards.
Though the instant decision represents an unjustifiable threat to the
operative freedom of amended rule 19, it is entirely possible that other
federal courts will follow it. 55 If so, the liberalization in compulsory joinder
requirements which amended rule 19 apparently seeks to effect would be
thwarted. For this reason, it is urged that continued thought be given to
recent proposals recommending nationwide service of process as a means
of remedying the absent party problem. This would empower federal courts
to summon and adjudicate the rights of all absent parties, whether indispensable or merely necessary. 50
William H. Danne, Jr.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
STATZ

Joiner & Miller, supra note 39, at 629-30, 648.
See note 31 supra.
See notes 27, 28 supra and accompanying text.
See Fink, supra note 11, at 431.
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Id. at 472.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
See Fink, supra note 11, at 427.
Id. at 436-48. See ALI STUDY OF THn DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BTWEEN
AND F4DRAL COURTS 32-43, 120-60 (Official Draft 1965).
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LABOR LAW - CRAFT SEVERANCE TION 9(b) (2) WILL BE EVALUATED

PETITIONS FILED UNDER

SEC-

ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS IN

LIGHT OF THE TOTAL INTERESTS OF ALL

THOSE

CONCERNED.

Mallinckrodt Chem. Works (N.L.R.B. 1966)
A member local of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for severance of twelve
instrument mechanics from a production maintenance unit comprised of
130 production operators and 150 maintenance employees. This group
had been represented for twenty-five years by a plant-wide unit. The
Mallinckrodt plant is engaged in a continuous processing system of extracting uranium metal from raw ore for sale exclusively to the Atomic
Energy Commission. The instrument mechanics work out of physically
distinct facilities under separate supervision, with their own seniority,
and receive pay commensurate with other instrument mechanics in the
industry. Under the hiring policy of the plant, experienced men are hired
and then progress under a specific scheme to a "Class A" status. The
work of the instrument mechanics is technical in nature and seventy-five
per cent of their time is spent on the production line repairing, in coordination with the line employees, the control apparatus that regulates
production operations. If an unplanned shutdown occurs, it requires
several days to resume production. Petitioner union, while representing
no other separate craft units of this nature, does represent such craftsmen in larger plant units. The experience of the union is primarily in
representing electricians rather than instrument mechanics like those in
the Mallinckrodt plant.
Using the analysis of the heretofore controlling severance policy, the
American Potash doctrine,' the Board initially found that a severable
craft unit did exist, but that petitioner union was not a traditional representative of this craft. However, at the request of the employer, the
Board took this opportunity to review its severance policy, and in so
doing overruled American Potash. It adopted a new six point analysis
designed to balance the total interests of all the parties and reached the
same result it would have under American Potash, but on different
grounds, holding that the severance petition would be denied because of
the essential role played by the instrument mechanics in the actual production of the uranium metal, the existence of an integrated production
process and the submergence of the craft's interests into the existing
plant unit. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (64 L.R.R.M.)
1011 (NLRB Dec. 28, 1966).
The Board's initial problem in formulating a severance policy is to
fashion a suitable guideline that effectuates the general purposes of the
1. The NLRB's policy established in this case was to grant severance when
(1) a true craft requests such and (2) the union seeking to represent the craft unit
is a traditional representative of the craft. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107
N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
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National Labor Relations Act and, at the same time, recognizes the interests of the petitioning craftsmen. Since the inception of section 9(b) (2)
as part of the Wagner Act in 1935,2 the Board has vacillated in its
approach to the problem.3 Unguided by the statute itself, the Board, when
confronted with a petition to sever a craft unit, initially interpreted section 9(b) (2) to favor a larger plant unit over the smaller craft unit in
order to foster bargaining stability.4 However, in the 1937 case of Globe
Machine & Stamping Co.,5 a new position was adopted permitting selfdetermination by the craft units when a plant was initially unionized. A
quick reversal again took place in 1939 in the American Can Co. case,"
in which a satisfactory prior bargaining history was considered determinative in denying severance of a craft from an existing production and
maintenance unit. The new policy therein exemplified was aimed at continuing existing labor-management stability and fostering responsible
bargaining.
In the post World War II period, which was marked by the appointment of a new Board, a drift towards a more permissive policy began to
develop. In the International Minerals & Chem. Corp. decision 7 the Globe
doctrine of self-determination was partially revived in situations in which
a craft unit had never voted in a severance election, or had not done such
in the last three or four years. Tempering this development was the
coincident decision of the Board to more restrictively define the standards
to be met in order to qualify as a "craft." In 1947 Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley Act which amended section 9(b) (2) by adding a proviso
to sublate the American Can decision.8
Shortly after the amendment was passed the Board, in the National
Tube Co. decision,9 interpreted the proviso to mean that Congress had
2. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1946), which states:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to the employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof.
3. For the history of this fluctuation see generally Hawkins, Craft and Departmental Representation Under NLRB Unit Determination Policies (unpublished thesis
in Harvard Law School Library 1964) ; Denbo, Random Thoughts on NLRB's
American Potash Doctrines, 12 LAn. L.J. 249 (1961) ; Jones, Self Determination vs,
Stability of Labor Relations, 58 MICH. L. Rgv. 313 (1960) ; Krislov, Administrative
Approaches to Craft Severance, 5 LAB. L.J. 231 (1954) ; Rathbun, The Taft-Hartley
Act and Craft Unit Bargaining,59 YALE L.J. 1023 (1950).
4. Jones, Self Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations, 58 MICH. L. Rgv.
313, 315 (1960).
5. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
6. 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939).
7. 71 N.L.R.B. 878 (1946). This case was actually a culmination of a more
liberal trend initiated in General Elec. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 57 (1944).
8. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 159(b) (2) (1964), which added:
Provided, That the Board shall not . . . (2)

decide that any craft unit is

inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been
established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees
in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation ....
9. 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948). This holding reaffirmed a similar denial of severance
in the basic steel industry in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 617 (1942).
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foreclosed the board from making a prior unit determination the controlling test, but that this element could remain as a factor. Under this
decision the basic steel industry was held to be most appropriately represented by plant-wide units.10 A reversal of policy again took place after
the Eisenhower Board was appointed. In the 1954 decision of American
Potash Chem. Co.," the Board interpreted the Taft-Hartley amendment
to section 9(b) (2) as an affirmative mandate to allow self-determination
in craft severance cases when a genuine craft requests such, notwithstanding prior bargaining history:
Accordingly we find that the intent of Congress will best be
effectuated by a finding . . . that a craft group will be appropriate
for severance purposes in cases where a true craft group is sought
and where, in addition, the union 2seeking to represent it is one which
traditionally represents the craft.'
The Board specifically indicated that it intended to rigidly enforce
both of these requirements.' 3 Also, for the first time since 1935, a definitive statement of policy for departmental units was established.' 4 Under
the American Potash doctrine, as it evolved, specific factors were of import
in qualifying as a craft. Some of these hallmarks of a craft were: necessity of an apprenticeship or comparable experience,' 5 separate supervision,' 6 separate seniority,' 7 and distinct pay scales, hours and working
conditions.' 8 In addition, a union would not qualify as a traditional representative if it merely represented similar craftsmen in plant units,' 9 or
20
had a substantial portion of its membership formed of such craftsmen.
10. The National Tube doctrine was also extended to the basic aluminum industry
in Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950) ; the lumber industry in
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949); and the wet milling industry
in Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 362 (1948).
11. 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954). See generally Note, Craft Severance: The
Doctrine of American Potash, 46 VA. L. Rvv. 756 (1960).
12. 107 N.L.R.B. at 1422.
13. The Board set general criteria that would have to be met:
In our opinion a true craft unit consists of a distinct and homogeneous group
of skilled journeymen craftsmen, working as such, together with their apprentices
and/or helpers. To be a "journeyman craftsmen," an individual must have a kind
and degree of skill which is normally acquired only by undergoing a substantial
period of apprenticeship or comparable training. . . . Furthermore, such craftsmen must be primarily engaged in the performance of tasks requiring the exercise
of their craft skills.
In requiring that the union seeking severance must be the one which traditionally represents the craft we are taking cognizance of the fact that there are
unions which have devoted themselves to the special problems of the various craft
employees. ...
Id. at 1422-24.
14. "In this connection, we also recognize the equities of the employees in certain
other minority groups though lacking the hallmark of craft skill, may also require that
they be treated as severable units." Id. at 1424.
15. Container Corp. of America, 121 N.L.R.B. 249 (1958).
16. Hughes Aircraft Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 504 (1956).
17. Universal Match Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1956).
18. Sealtest So. Dairies Div., National Dairy Prod. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1277
(1958).
19. Nisset Baking Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 589 (1961).
20. Standard Oil Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1017 (1956).
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A history of separate and specialized representation of the craft was required, but a union that was specifically formed to represent a particular
craft or departmental unit would qualify. 21 Even though American Potash
followed the Globe concept of self-determination, it specifically sustained
the vitality of the National Tube doctrine. In fact, subsequent to American Potash, the National Tube doctrine was held applicable to new plants
22
within the exempted industries.
Judicial review of severance decisions is unusual, 23 because an employer must refuse to bargain with the Board-certified craft union and
then litigate the decision in an unfair labor practice action brought against
the employer for failure to bargain 24 under section 8(a) (5).25 However,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has been acutely critical of the
Board's policy formulated in American Potash. In 1959 this court denied
an enforcement order requested in NLRB v. PittsburghPlate Glass Co. 26
The criticism of the court was that by using the Globe doctrine the Board
had effectively abdicated its statutory duty to make determinations on a
"case by case" basis and had allowed the mere whim of the craftsmen
to govern. Although the court didn't specifically address itself to the
matter, its rationale is equally applicable to and critical of the Board's
extension of the National Tube doctrine to a new plant within the four
industries. This is a reasonable inference to draw because in these instances the Board clearly violates the specific proviso of section 9(b) (2)
not "to decide that any craft unit is inappropriate ... on the ground that
a different unit has been established by prior Board determination .... ,,2T
The court refused enforcement of this particular order, because it felt
that the same factors of an integrated production process and prior history
of plant bargaining were found in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass plant that
were found in the National Tube case. The court therefore concluded that
it was an arbitrary exercise of discretion to allow one industry to have
a plant unit and to deny the same to another industry on the same essential facts.28 This same circuit in 1962 reaffirmed its disapproval of the
American Potash policy and in similar circumstances again denied an
29
enforcement petition.
21. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1618 (1954), overruling Elgin
Nat'l Watch Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 273 (1954).
22. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 695 (1957).
23. In AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), the Court held that union certifications were not directly reviewable under § 10(f) of the NLRA, 72 Stat. 148 (1958),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964).
24. An alternative means of attaining review is available since Board orders are
not self-enforcing and an enforcement order must be issued by the court of appeals.
It is possible to contest the Board decision in this enforcement proceeding. E.g.,
NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 943 (1960).
25. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964), makes failure to bargain
with a duly recognized union an unfair labor practice.
26. 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960).
27. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1964).
28. See generally Denbo, Random Thoughts on NLRB's American Potash

Doctrine, 12 LAn. L.J. 249, 252-53 (1961).
29. Royal McBee Corp. v. NLRB, 302 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1962).
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Two seemingly conflicting interests are at issue in formulation by the
NLRB of its severance policy. On one hand, a craftsman is entitled to
be a member of a union and, as a corollary of this, should be able to select
a bargaining representative that is attuned to his peculiar interests. In
general, a craft union will be the representative best meeting the needs
of a worker so situated. Against this consideration is the overall need
for stability in labor-management relations, and the interests of the other
plant employees in having a unified bargaining unit in order to present
the strongest possible position in collective bargaining. In historical perspective, each of these has at one time or another been the primary goal
of the Board's severance policy. 0 The formulation enunciated in Mallinckrodt is designed to equitably balance these interests in making decisions under section 9(b) (2).
By adopting the "total interests" policy the Board has overruled
almost two decades of labor law that has developed since National Tube
and American Potash. The reason for this reversal is premised on two
planes. American Potash rested on the assumption that it was not the
essential role of the Board to "dictate the course and pattern of labor
organization in our vast industrial complex."' 31 The Board now adopts
the criticism of its earlier policies as leveled in the Pittsburgh case and
acknowledges its unjustified interpretation of the Taft-Hartley amendment, thereby confirming that there is a statutory duty under section
9(b) (2) to decide each case on its individual facts. Resort is also had to
the legislative history of this section which, on close reading, indicates
that the amendment was not designed to curtail the discretion of the Board,
but was in fact intended to free it from any binding effect of its prior
determinations.8 2 Under the interpretation of section 9(b)(2) in Mallinckrodt, the Board is to meet this duty by reference to the total interests
of those involved.
The second plane of approach is to posit this new interpretation of
section 9(b) (2), and then to evaluate whether the American Potash
policy is in conformity with it. The Board finds its ultimate goal to be
attained determined by Congress in the general delegation section of the
National Labor Relations Act: "It is the purpose and policy . . . to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers. .... ,,3

Since the American Potash doctrine is basically that of the Globe selfdetermination doctrine, the answer is in the negative. Due to the fact
that American Potash serves only the interests of the craft employee and
sustains the arbitrary immunization of four industries under National
30. See generally Jones, Self Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations,
58 MIcH. L. REv. 313, 314 (1960); Rathbun, The Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Unit
Bargaining, 59 YALE L.J. 1023, 1025-29 (1950).
31. American Potash & Chem. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1422 (1954).
32. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 2 LAD. RSL. Ri~. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1011, 1014 &
n.9 (NLRB Dec. 28, 1966).
33. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141(b) (1964).
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Tube, a substantially new policy formulation is necessary to assess and
protect the interests of all concerned.
The Board, therefore, adopts a six-point criterion to weigh the interests of craft employees, plant employees, the employers and the nation:
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of a distinct and
homogeneous group of skilled journeymen craftsmen performing the
functions of their craft on a nonrepetitive basis, or of employees
constituting a functionally distinct department, working in trades or
occupations for which a tradition of separate representation exists.
2. The history of collective bargaining of the employees sought
and at the plant involved, and at other plants of the employer, with
emphasis on whether the existing patterns of bargaining are productive of stability in labor relations, and whether such stability will be
unduly disrupted by the destruction of the existing patterns of representation.
3. The extent to which the employees in the proposed unit have
established and maintained their separate identity during the period
of inclusion in a broader unit, and the extent of their participation
or lack of participation in the establishment and maintenance of the
existing pattern of representation and the prior opportunities, if any,
afforded them to obtain separate representation.
4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's production
processes, including the extent to which the continued normal operation of the production processes is dependent upon the performance
of the assigned functions of the employees in the proposed unit.
6. The qualifications of the union seeking to "carve out" a separate unit, including that union's experience 8in
4 representing employees
like those involved in the severance action.
These six factors are not new, but are rather a composite of the diverse
considerations that the Board has utilized since the original Wagner Act. 5
These factors are not to be considered exclusive, but are the dominant
ones in light of the existing circumstances in plant organizational
schemes. 80
34. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 2 LAB. IrL. RMr. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1011, 1016
(NLRB Dec. 28, 1966).
35. All of the policy decisions of the NLRB in the craft severance area have been
enunciated in actual cases before the Board. Professor Peck criticizes this method

charging that it is an improper means of performing the Board's rule-making function,

because it does not conform to the method stipulated by the Administrative Procedure

Act. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations

Board, 70 YALU L.J. 729, 743-46 (1961).
36. The Board left open what steps and policies it might adopt in the future in

order to conform to technological changes. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 2 LAB. R L.
REP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1011, 1016-17 & n.16 (NLRB Dec. 28, 1966). On the problem of
technological change and craft severance, see generally Fanning, The Challenge of

Automation in the Light of the Natural Law, 11
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A seventh factor may be added which the Board has not expressly
articulated. This is the role played by a particular plant or industry in
national defense, and the resultant necessity of labor stability. Mallinckrodt refers specifically to this, although not within its stated six considerations. "The Employer is engaged in production of uranium metal.
It is the only enterprise in the country which is engaged in all phases of
production .... Continued stability . . .is vital to our national defense."3 7

The National Tube case also made reference to the role of basic steel:
"[A]nd would necessarily have an adverse effect upon its productive
capacity in an industry of vital national concern."3 8 Both of these cases
indicate that there may well be denials of severance premised on the vital
interests of the nation which are involved. Of course, the question is
what industries will fall into such a classification. One can argue that at
least those similar to Mallinckrodt will.
Mallinckrodt and its two companion cases, E. I. Dupont 9 and Holmberg Inc., 40 decided the same day, present three applications of the new

policy. An attempt will be made to analyze these applications of the new
standards in order to focus on the critical factors that might be determinative in the consideration of a severance petition.
In none of the three cases was the factor of industry-wide bargaining history at issue. However, in each case the Board applied the standards
developed under American Potash to determine whether a craft unit
existed. It should be noted, moreover, that the Board in Mallinckrodt
made specific reference to its intent to be more demanding in the standards
that must be met in order to qualify as a "craft."'41 It seems clear that this
particular point is not merely one which the Board weighs in its balancing
of interests, but rather is a condition precedent to the weighing of other
factors in the "total interests" test. The determination of whether a severance should be granted in light of all considerations necessarily assumes
Technology and NLRB Decisions in Bargaining Unit and JurisdictionalDispute Cases,
16 LAB. L.J. 731, 739-43 (1965).
37. 2 LAB. RL. Rep. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1011, 1017 (NLRB Dec. 28, 1966).
38. National Tube Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1207 (1948).
39. 2 LAB. RL. REP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1021 (NLRB Dec. 28, 1966). Severance
was granted* to an electrician's unit which spends 90% of its time performing craft
skills on the production line in coordination with the production employees. The
electricians serve an apprenticeship, have separate supervision, facilities, seniority and
wage scale. There was no prior bargaining history on a plant-wide basis. The Board
held that there was a distinct community of interests in the unit even though there
was an integrated production process. Mr. Fanning concurred in the result, but
excepted to the emphasis placed on the lack of a prior bargaining history.
40. 2 LAB. ReL. Rep. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1025 (NLRB Dec. 28, 1966). A tool room
unit was denied severance from a production maintenance group that had bargained
for it during the past twenty-four years, and had won special recognition for the tool
room unit. Physical facilities were used by others and an overall seniority system was
used with members of the tool room working on the lines during work slow-downs.
The Board held there was an identity of interests between the two groups. Mr.
Fanning, dissenting, argued that the Regional Director's decision to allow severance
should be affirmed. He objected to what he considered to be the determining effect
given to the prior bargaining history.
41. 2 LAB. ReL. Rep. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1011, 1016 n.14 (NLRB Dec. 28, 1966).
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that there is a unit that would be appropriate if the other factors weigh
in its favor.
Only Mallinckrodt presented an issue of whether the union seeking
the severance was a traditional representative of such craftsmen. Again
the Board utilized its American Potash guidelines and found that the
union did not qualify as such a representative. Under the new policy
this was not to be considered determinative, and therefore this requirement will no longer be a necessary condition to severance. The wisdom
of this change is dubious. If a union is not able to adapt to the needs
of the craft unit a disruption of labor-management relations is likely to
occur. The inability of the non-traditional union to adequately represent
the craft may also have the detrimental effect of leading to a series of
union changeovers.
The remaining three factors in the "total interests" test - prior
bargaining history, the identity of interests norm and the integrated production process - were crucial in each of the three cases. Little insight
can be gained from the tests themselves since they are merely stated in
the abstract. However, the application of these in the triology of cases
is enlightening in that it reveals two distinct points of departure. Initially
it must be determined whether a particular factor will weigh in favor of
granting severance or towards denial of such. A corollary inquiry is
whether or not one factor will be weighed more heavily than another.
The second point of departure is whether these separately enunciated considerations interplay one with another, and if so, to what extent. A
divergence of approach exists between the majority of the Board and the
dissenting member, Mr. Fanning, 42 in regard to these points. The subsequent analysis is designed to elucidate and evaluate the merits of these
conflicting approaches.
In both Mallinckrodt and Dupont, the Board found that a physically
integrated production process of craft functions and production functions existed. Integration in the Board's sense is defined in the test itself:
"[T]he extent to which the continued normal operation of the production
processes is dependent upon the performance of the assigned functions
of the employees in the proposed units." 43 In Mallinckrodt a severance
was denied, but in Dupont it was granted. 44 This bears out the reference
by the Board that National Tube was overruled only to the extent that
42. Mr. Fanning concurs in the reevaluation of American Potash, but objects to
the application of the new analysis. Id. at 1016-17 (dissenting opinion).
43. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
44. A difference of degree might also be noted in regard to the integration of
function in Mallinckrodt and Dupont. The instrument mechanics in the Mallinckrodt
plant were absolutely essential to the production process since most of their work
was in repairing control apparatus that was necessary to the process. Whereas, in
the Dupont operation, the majority of the electrician's work was preventive maintenance of the operating machinery and in-the-shop repair of electrical equipment. It is
also pertinent that in the Dupont plant there were instrument mechanics which performed tasks similar to those performed by their counterparts in the Mallinckrodt plant.
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severance would not automatically be denied, but that physical integra4
tion would remain a factor. 5
Ultimately, all three cases turn on the identity of interests norm that
the Board has established in the third consideration. In both Mallinckrodt
and Holmberg the Board found that there was a submerging of the unique
interests of the unit to be severed - and therefore a loss of whatever
separate identity the unit might otherwise have had - into the overall
interests of the existing plant unit. But in Dupont the finding was to the
contrary. The Board considers this as a finding of fact to be determined
from all the factual circumstances; including the subjective relationship
of the craftsmen to the other employees insofar as there is a mutual
identity in the existing plant unit. A differing position is taken by Mr.
Fanning who approaches this question from a standpoint similar to that
which is used in the physical integration test as understood by the majority. The actual role of the craftsmen in the production process is the
criterion that is indicative of the identity of interests. By example he
states that the following are indicative of a merging of interests: "...
direct participation in the production process itself; the repetitive performance of routine tasks at a more or less fixed work station along the
assembly line ...or the acquisition of special skills ...to enable them
to work on their employer's specialized equipment." 4 6 The majority of
the Board considers this physical interrelationship of function as only
one element in making the factual determination of whether or not a
single community of interests exists, and that the lack of such will not
bar an affirmative finding on this point.47 Mr. Fanning's approach to this
point is related to his divergent conception of the bearing that prior bargaining history should play in making severance decisions.
Under the majority's approach the identity of interest is considered
in light of prior bargaining history. In both Mallinckrodt and Holmberg
the Board weighed the prior stable bargaining history in which the crafts
had received special recognition by different wage scales, hours and
seniority as indicative of a merging of the craft interests into the plant
unit, because the plant unit by recognizing these special needs had absorbed
these interests into its makeup. Mr. Fanning sees the recognition of the
special needs of the craft as an objectively discernible indication of the
existence of a separate identity in the craft. This divergence of approach
may be explained by the fact that Mr. Fanning posits a formal right in
every genuine craft unit to be severed from the plant unit, and also views
section 9(b) (2) as giving rise to a presumption that a severance request
should be granted.48 He thus requires objective indications of the merg45. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 2 LAB.
(NLRB Dec. 28, 1966).
46. Id. at 1019 (dissenting opinion).

RIL.

RXP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1011, 1017 n.17

47. For an example of this difference of approach in application, see North Am.
Aviation, Inc., 2 LAB. RVL. RsP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1146 (NLRB Jan. 27, 1966).
48. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 2 LAB. RZL. RVP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1011, 1018

(NLRB Dec. 28, 1966) (dissenting opinion).
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ing of the craft to rebut this. The majority conceives of a right that exists
only when the reason for the right, the special interests of the craftsmen,
demands it.
Mr. Fanning fails to recognize the depth of the prior bargaining test
as applied by the majority. The Board evaluates the prior history in light
of the effects it has had: "[W]hether the existing patterns of bargaining
are productive of stability in labor relations, and whether such stability
in labor relations will be unduly disrupted by the destruction of the existing patterns of representation." 49 Therefore, when the existing pattern
of bargaining fulfills the underlying purpose of the National Labor Relations Act, that is, to promote stability in bargaining, and the severance
order would adversely affect the smooth functioning of the plant unit and
orderly bargaining patterns, the prior history will have weighted effect
against severance. In this perspective there is justification in giving this
factor weighted bearing.
Aside from the stated qualifications of the bargaining history test,
the Board in Mallinckrodt and Holmberg has engrafted another qualification onto the test. In both instances the Board specifically found that the
employees requesting a craft severance had benefited from wages, hours
and working conditions that were commensurate with their status qua
craftsmen. Therefore, the test, at least as presently applied, seems to
require that bargaining history be given a weighted bearing only upon
evidence showing fair representation of the interests of the craftsmen in
the plant unit. If this were not the case the Board would presumably
favor severance.
From the newly enunciated analytical tests of Mallinckrodt, and their
subsequent applications in Dupont and Holmberg, a fundamentally new
policy has evolved. In formulating prior policies the Board had a basic
difficulty because the right of craftsmen to have craft representation was
traditionally viewed as almost absolute in nature, and any divergence from
this had to be substantiated by specific countervailing factors militating
against severance. Under the Mallinckrodt approach, this right is acknowledged only when the reason for the right, the unique needs and interests
of the craftsmen, requires it. Even when this need is found, a severance
might not be granted when there is an overriding national interest. The
possibilities of craft severance have been substantially lessened by the
Mallinckrodt decision. The requirements to qualify as a craft unit may
be more stringent in the future, and the Board's new approach of viewing
the right to craft representation from a substantial rather than formal
perspective will also militate against a finding that a craft unit is
appropriate.
Walter John Taggart
49. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX CO-TRUSTEE

To

SETTLOR'S DISCRETIONARY

DISTRIBUTE OR ACCUMULATE

REQUIRES THAT ACCUMULATED TRUST INCOME
THE SETTLOR'S GROSS ESTATE.

INCOME

BE INCLUDED IN

United States v. O'Malley (U.S. 1966)
Decedent had created five irrevocable trusts during 1936 and 1937,
each substantially identical except for the identities of the beneficiaries,
naming himself as one of three trustees. Each instrument vested with the
trustees the right to either accumulate or distribute income and required
that accumulated income be added to the principal. By surrendering all
power to revoke, change, or modify the terms of the trust, the decedent
effectively divested himself of all financial interest in the corpus or income.
At the time of his death the combined value of the trusts was more than
three times the original corpus. The increment was attributable solely
to the accumulation of income and its judicious reinvestment.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue valued the gross estate to
include both the principal of the combined original trusts and the income
subsequently accumulated. Decedent's executors paid an assessed deficiency
under protest and instituted an action in the federal district court to secure
a refund of the sum. The district court' decided that the original corpus of
the combined trusts was includable in the estate,2 but excluded that portion
of the estate which represented accumulated income. The Commissioner
appealed solely to challenge the exclusion of accumulated income but the
Seventh Circuit affirmed." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
accumulated income should be included in the gross estate because under
section 811 (c) (1) (B) (ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939:4 (1) the
power of the decedent, as one of the trustees, to distribute or accumulate
trust income was sufficient to be deemed the power to "designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom,"
and (2) that a "transfer" had been made with regard to accumulated income
included in the principal. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
1. O'Malley v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
2. The court held that decedent's power as one of the trustees to designate whether
to accumulate income was of such significance as to bring the trust within the purview
of § 811(c) (i) (B) (ii) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 (now INT. RXv. COD4 ol 1954,

§ 2036(a) (2)).
3. O'Malley v. United States, 340 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1964).
4. To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer ... by trust or otherwise - ...
(B) Under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or (ii) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom. . ..
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c) (1) (B), 46 Stat. 1516 (now INt. Rgv. CODE oF 1954,
§ 2036(a) (2)).
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The intent of Congress in enacting the federal estate tax was to levy
upon transfers of property which occur at death.5 The original act passed
in 1916 was comparatively simple. 6 However, this simplicity, coupled with
the Supreme Court's reluctance to interpret the statute liberally and the
ingenuity of taxpayers in seeking to avoid the intent of the law, has caused
the present statutory maze. 7 The particular section considered in the
present case is one of those designed to alleviate the effects of a combination of taxpayer creativity and the narrow construction given the section's
forerunner by the Supreme Court in May v. Heiner,8 and the affirmance
of that decision in three subsequent per curiam opinions. 9
The judicial history of the issue presented in O'Malley has its genesis
in the 1956 decision of the Seventh Circuit in Commissioner v. Estate of
McDermott.10 Under circumstances virtually identical with those of the
present case, the court ruled that the accumulated income of the trust was
not to be included in the gross estate because there had been no "transfer"
of the income to the trust by the decedent as required by the statute. Justification for this rule was based upon earlier decisions" which had considered
the question of whether to include the accumulated income of trusts whose
principals were included in the gross estate because the trust had been
deemed to have been created in contemplation of death. It had been uniformly held that the accumulated income was to be excluded from the gross
estate because the settlor had completely divested himself of any interest
in the property at the time of the creation of the trust and therefore did
not possess the control or ownership necessary to "transfer" the afteraccumulated income to the trust.
Although criticized, 12 the rule of the Seventh Circuit was followed' 3
until 1964 when the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expressly refused
to adopt it and affirmed' 4 a decision of the tax court 15 which had held that
5.

See generally LOWNDES &

KRAMER,

FDERAL

ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 5

(2d ed. 1962).
6. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, 777.
7. See LoWNDES & KRAMER, supra note 5, at 80-98.

8. 281 U.S. 238 (1930), overruled in Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S.
632 (1949). The court held that the corpus of a trust providing for payment of income
to the spouse for his life, then to the grantor for her life, with the remainder to the
children, was not includable in the estate under an act which provided for the inclusion
of all property,
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
his death....
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1097.
9. McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931) ; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783
(1931) ; Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931).
10. 222 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1955), 54 MIcH. L. Rzv. 577 (1956), 51 Nw. U.L. Rev.
149 (1956), 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 779.
11. Commissioner v. Gidwitz, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949).
12. O'Malley v. United States, 340 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1964) (concurring
opinion) ; O'Malley v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 30, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1963) ; LOWNDES
& KRAMER, supra note 5, at 434.
13. Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1960).
14. Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964), 45 B.U.L. Rev. 426
(1965), 40 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 387 (1965), 18 VAND. L. Rlv. 285 (1964).
15. Estate of Round v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 970 (1963).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/12

36

Editors: Recent Developments
SPRING

1967]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

the accumulated income of a similar trust was includable in the gross estate
of the decedent. Judge Hartigan reasoned that:
The accumulations remained subject to the same control by decedent
that caused the corpus to be included in his gross estate. And since
the transfer of the trust property was incomplete until decedent, by
his death, relinquished the control he held over such property, it follows
that the property must be valued at the time of death, when the transfer
is complete and the accumulations included in the valuation. 16
The opinion was particularly critical of the reliance placed by the Seventh
Circuit on Commissioner v. Gidwitz17 and Burns v. Commissioner' to
support its ruling that accumulated income is not includable in the gross
estate where the decedent has retained the power to designate the disposition of the income. Judge Hartigan distinguished these cases on the
ground that both involved transfers of property in contemplation of death
which were complete in all respects at the time they were made, whereas a
trust in which the settlor has retained the power of designation is not a
complete transfer until he relinquishes that power.
In the principal case, the Supreme Court declared that the applicability
of the statute depends upon the answer to two inquiries:
Whether . . . [decedent] retained a power "to designate the person

who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom",
and second, whether the property sought to be included, namely, the
portions of the trust principal representing accumulated income, was
the subject of a previous transfer by . . . [decedent]. 1 9

The ability of the settlor to distribute or accumulate income, thereby
denying immediate enjoyment by the beneficiaries and conditioning their
eventual enjoyment upon their surviving the termination of the trust, has
long been held to be a significant power which necessitates the inclusion
of the corpus in the gross estate. 20 With this principle in mind the Court
concluded that "the first condition to taxing accumulated income added to
principal is satisfied, for the income from these increments to principal
was subject to the identical power in . . . [decedent] to distribute or

accumulate until the very moment of death."'21 Having answered this
threshold question, the Court turned to the concept of "transfer" which had
been the crux of the problem in the lower courts. In unequivocal terms,
Mr. Justice White declared that the decedent had made the requisite
transfer not only of property earmarked for the corpus, but of the accumu16. Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590, 596 (1st Cir. 1964). To escape the
estate tax an inter vivos transfer must be absolute; the decedent may retain no string
over the transferred property. See Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632
(1949); Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946) ; Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1928).
17. 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952).
18. 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949).
19. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 630 (1966).
20. Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 487 (1946).
21. 383 U.S. 627, 632 (1966).
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lated income as well. His conclusion is based on two lines of reasoning:
First, decedent had given up all interest in the trust property except control over the disposition of the income. When he decided to accumulate
rather than to distribute it he "transferred" the income in a very real sense,
that is to say, all increments in the corpus made possible by the addition
of accumulated income were directly traceable to the acts of decedent.
Second, the establishment of the trust was not complete at the time of its
inception as long as the settlor retained a certain degree of control over it.
The transfer did not become complete until this string was cut at the time
of his demise. It necessarily follows that any income accumulated before
his death was transferred together with the trust corpus when the control
was finally relinquished.
An examination of the judicial construction of a closely related section
of the Code reveals a substantial argument that the decision in the instant
case has created an inconsistency in the law. Subdivision (c) (1) (A) of
section 81122 requires the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate of any
transfers made in contemplation of death. It has been uniformly held that
accumulated income generated by an irrevocable trust, created in contemplation of death, over which the settlor retained no power, is not included in the estate even though the corpus is included. 23 Reasoning
analogically, it would seem that this rule should be applied to each type of
trust, both of which are inter vivos attempts to avoid the estate tax and
which have been included by Congress because of their basically testamentary nature. Prior to the First Circuit's decision this analysis was
accepted by all courts which had entertained the issue. The issue therefore
narrows to whether the Supreme Court is justified in setting aside this
established doctrine and imposing two different procedures in such closely
related areas.
Although there are persuasive arguments which deny that the Court's
treatment is justifiable,24 the cogency of those in favor of it is more impressive. The intent of the estate tax laws is to impose a tax upon the transfer
of property at death. In order to avoid this tax individuals have devised a
number of inter vivos passages of title which appear not to be transfers
of property at death but which accomplish the same purpose. Over the
years Congress has dealt with each new innovation, and court opinion
sustaining it, on an ad hoc basis in order to further its basic tax policy. 25
The two sections now under consideration are examples of such corrective measures.
In the contemplation of death situation the settlor unequivocably
transfers property to the transferee. His ordinary motive is to avoid the
22. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c) (1) (A), 46 Stat. 1516 (now INT. RXv. CODX
op 1954, § 2035).
23. Commissioner v. Gidwitz, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949), affirming Estate of Frizzell, 9 T.C. 979 (1947).
Cf. Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. 443 (1941).
24. See Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. R v. 387 (1965).
25. See LowNDZS & KRAMXR, supra note 8, at 80-99.
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tax on this property only, and not on future income which is now completely in the control of the transferee. Therefore, it is held that the income
is not the subject of testamentary transfer. When a power is retained,
however, the underlying philosophy justifying the imposition of an estate
tax is generally stated to be:
An estate tax should be imposed upon property transfered during life
where the transfer is essentially testamentary. A transfer is essentially
testamentary when possession or
enjoyment by the transferee must
26
wait the death of the transferor.
Since the accumulated income cannot be enjoyed until the settlor relinquishes his control at the time of his death, the income is basically a testamentary disposition and should be included in the estate.
A second reason for confusion in this area is that the Seventh Circuit
in McDermott insisted upon applying traditional property concepts of
ownership to tax problems. 27 That court reasoned that when the settlor
created the trust he gave up his property interest in the corpus. There is
no question that traditionally this is true. The legal ownership vested in
the trustee and the equitable interest in the beneficiary. Since the transferor had neither the legal or equitable ownership it was impossible for
him to "transfer" the income to the trust as is required by the statute. But
this analysis is insufficient for tax purposes. The intent of the statute is
not to determine ownership but to place the tax on the person who has
control of the economic benefit. 28 Therefore, for tax purposes, the transfer
is not effective until the string retained by the grantor is cut at his death.
When this occurs, both the corpus and the accumulated income are "transferred" to the trustee.
In addition to the two arguments above, a very practical reason for
including the accumulated income in the gross estate merits consideration.
If a settlor who is the controlling stockholder in a closely held family
corporation seeks to avoid the heavy estate tax on the transfer of that
stock at his death, yet also wishes to retain a degree of control over his
property, he might transfer a large percentage of his holdings to a trustee
but retain control over the distribution of the trust income. He could not
avoid the tax on the stock which is transferred, but by regulating the
value of the stock subsequent to its transfer, he could limit the tax. This
phenomenon is not readily apparent until one considers that the value of
the stock is influenced very greatly by income which has been retained by
the corporation. If after the establishment of the trust the settlor is able,
by virtue of his controlling interest, to have a sufficient percentage of the
retained earnings distributed by dividend, the total value of trust property
will remain the same, but for estate tax purposes, the amount of this
26.

WARREN & SURRIy, CASXS ON F4DXRAL ESTAT4 AND GVrT TAXATION

(1961).
27. See MONTCOMIRY, FZDXRAL TAxIs 626-30 (1951).
28. Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
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dividend which has been accumulated will be excluded from the estate. 29
This dividend will necessarily reduce the market value of the stock, thus
allowing for a lower estate tax. The inequity of the McDermott rule is
obvious and to further it would, as the government argued,3 0 be in contradiction to the intention of Congress.
Tied very closely to the federal estate tax system are the federal gift
tax provisions. An examination of a development in the former would be
incomplete without a consideration of the ramifications of the latter. In
light of this, it has been argued in support of the McDermott rule that the
excluded accumulated income will not go untaxed because it is subject to
the gift tax provisions. 31 This analysis, though plausible, fails to consider
that in most cases the amount of the gift tax will be less than that assessed
as the estate tax.3 2 Since effective use of such a trust is almost entirely
limited to large accumulations of wealth, the difference in application of the
gift tax as opposed to the estate tax would be substantial in monetary terms.
Secondly, inherent in this argument is the assumption that the gift tax
should be construed in pari materia with the estate tax. If this were true
the two taxes would be mutually exclusive because the requirement of the
gift tax that the transfer be complete, and the requirement of the estate
tax that the decedent have control over the property included in his estate,
are in direct opposition. This assumption, while conceptually very inviting,
has not been evident in application. In fact, it has been rejected by the
Supreme Court. 33 There are numerous situations where a transfer is incomplete and therefore includable in the gross estate for estate tax purposes
and yet is taxed at its inception under gift tax regulations.3 4 The times
when the two taxes are correlated appear to be products of coincidence
rather than plan. 35 It should then be evident that the possible subjection
of the accumulated income in the instant case to the provisions of the gift
tax does not militate against its inclusion in the estate tax.3 6
29. This is the situation in the present case.
30. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 10-12. In an attempt to refute the Government's
contention that a tax loophole has been created by the Seventh Circuit, respondent
asserts that this arrangement would reward the decedent with one limited benefit, the
ability to dictate whether the income will be accumulated. He contends that there is
no tax saving created because the settlor could eliminate the entire estate tax liability
by merely relinquishing this "narrow right" of a retained power to designate the
disposition of trust income. Brief for Respondent, pp. 10-11. However, this analysis
disregards an essential consideration. Congress has declared that the retention of this
type of power and an avoidance of the estate tax are mutually exclusive. In order
for the decedent to avoid the estate tax he must give up this right or, in the alternative, he must pay the tax in order to retain the power.
31. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 2511 ; Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2 5 11-2(a), (b), (d) (1959).
See 40 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 387, 390 (1965).
32. Compare the rate schedule in § 2001 of the INT. Rtv. CODE OV 1954, with that
in § 2502 of the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954.
33. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943). This case negated any inference that the two taxes should be construed in pari materia which might have been
drawn from the earlier case of Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
34. See LOWNDES & KRAMER, supra note 8, at 671-81, for a comprehensive analysis
of cases in which the two taxes are not correlated.
35. Id. at 672.
36. The foregoing discussion does not exhaust the catalogue of arguments favoring retention of the McDermott rule; two other reasons have been advanced: (1) the
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In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the opinion of the Court
is sound. Its holding appears to be fully consonant with the intent of
Congress in enacting the relevant section. By focusing on the underlying
policy of the estate tax the Court has avoided regressing to its earlier
fault of employing excessively formalistic interpretations of the Code.3 7 The
instant case manifests the present Court's more enlightened attitude.
Marc B. Kaplin

TAXATION E XPENSES

LITIGATION
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS INCURRED IN UNSUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF BUSINESS

RELATED CRIMINAL PROSECUTION HELD DEDUCTIBLE BY SUPREME
COURT.

Commissioner v. Tellier (U.S. 1966)
Taxpayer, who was engaged in the business of underwriting the
public sale of stock offerings and purchasing securities for resale to customers, was charged with violating the fraud section of the Securities
Act,1 the mail fraud statute,2 and with conspiring to violate these statutes.3
He was convicted and sentenced to pay an 18,000 dollars fine and to serve
four and one-half years in prison. The judgment of conviction was
affirmed on appeal. 4 Respondent incurred approximately 23,000 dollars
in legal expenses during his unsuccessful defense and claimed a deduction
for that amount on his federal income tax return. The Commissioner
statute is ambiguous and should therefore be interpreted in favor of the taxpayer, and
(2) there is significance in the fact that the McDermott rule has been applied for
nine years and Congress has not acted to correct this alleged misinterpretation of

its intent. See 40 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 387 (1965).

The effect of both of these starch-collar maxims is to avoid all substantive
considerations and substitute mere procedural fiats for logic and reasonable implementation of the broad congressional policies. It is an inherent difficulty in statutory
codification to effectively manifests the legislative intent in each and every possible
factual situation that may arise in the future. The best that can be substituted is a
manifestation of the overall policy of the legislature coupled with the implicit authorization to the courts to extend that policy to the myriad of future situations which
inevitably follow. On less lofty grounds, it is arguable that these maxims have been
extracted from their original sources in such a fashion as to impart to them a more
pervasive nature than was intended by their authors. See United States v. Davis,
370 U.S. 65, 71 (1962) ; Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739, 741 (5th Cir. 1949).
37. See LOWND4S & KRAMER, supra note 5, at 80-99.
1.
2.
3.
4.

48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1958).
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disallowed the deduction and his decision was affirmed by the Tax Court. 5
The Court of Appeals 6 for the Second Circuit reversed unanimously.7
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legal expenses
were deductible since the fees fell within the "ordinary and necessary"
requirements of section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code8 and that
the allowance of a deduction for expenses incurred in the unsuccessful
defense of a criminal charge does not frustrate any sharply defined public
policy. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).1
There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code or accompanying
regulations that prohibits the deduction of "ordinary and necessary" expenses on the basis that the expenses violate federal or state law or frustrate public policy. 10 However, in many cases the courts have denied
deductions for expenses incurred in illegal activity on the ground that
their allowance would frustrate public policy." The underlying rationale
of the public policy argument, or the frustration doctrine as it is called,
appears to be that the allowance of such a deduction will, through the
12
decrease of tax liability, benefit and thereby encourage illegal activity.
Prior to the instant case, the Supreme Court had considered a number of cases where the Commissioner had sought to have certain expenses,
arguably "ordinary and necessary", disallowed on public policy grounds."
As a result of these cases and lower federal court decisions, several types
of expenses were considered nondeductible. These included: (1) expenses
illegal in themselves ;14 (2) penalties and punitive sanctions imposed for
violation of law;15 and (3) attorney's fees incurred in an unsuccessful
5. Walter F. Tellier, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062 (1963).
6. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).

7. The opinion is noted in 65 CoLuM. L. Rev. 1111 (1965); 34 FORDHAM L. RXv.
155 (1965); 54 Go. L.J. 394 (1965) ; 40 N.Y.U.L. Rgv. 1003 (1965); 114 U. PA. L.
Rzv. 274 (1965) ; and 40 WASH. L. Rev. 920 (1965).
8. "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. .... "
INT. Rgv. CODE oF 1954, § 162(a) [hereinafter cited only by section].
9. The Court noted that the Commissioner conceded that the legal expenses
were within the meaning of § 162(a), and this note is concerned with the ciontention
that even though the expenditures fall within § 162(a), the deduction must nevertheless be disallowed on the basis of public policy.
10. See Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing
Deductions, U. So. CAL. 1954 TAX INST. 715, 729.
11. See, e.g., Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955) ; Frank A. Maddas,
40 B.T.A. 572, aff'd, 114 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1939).
12. See Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rv.
26, 35 (1958).
13 . Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); Hoover Motor Express
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) ; Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Lilly v.
Commissioner, 356 U.S. 90 (1958) ; Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943)
Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
14. See, e.g., Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955) ; Frank A. Maddas,
40 B.T.A. 571 (1939), aff'd, 114 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1940). Deductions have been
allowed generally for expenses which are themselves legal although incurred in the
conduct of an illegal activity. Courts have justified this on the ground that the Internal
Revenue Code taxes net, not gross, income. See Note, 51 COLUM. L. Riv. 752,
755 (1951).
15. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) (alternative
holding) ; Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
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defense of a criminal charge.' 6 In regard to expenses illegal in themselves,
the Court, in Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner,17 stated that the frustration of public policy is most direct when the expense sought to be deducted is itself prohibited by statute.' As an illustration of this type of
expense, the Court noted that state prohibited "kick-back" payments were
not deductible.' 9 Deductions for penalties have been denied where a taxpayer in a business related activity has violated a federal, 20 state, 21 or
local ordinance 2 and as a result has been required to pay a penalty authorized by the statute. The justification for the denial is that to allow
the deduction of such fines would mitigate the deterrent effect of the
statute.23 Such deductions have been disallowed even where there has
been no finding that the violation was intentional. 24 Litigation fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense of criminal charges which resulted in
fines being imposed on the taxpayer have been disallowed on the rationale
that if the fines cannot be deducted, the legal expenses incurred in litigating the question of whether the fine should be imposed should fall with
the fine.

25

Application of the frustration doctrine has been limited by the general
principle that the federal income tax is a tax on net income, not gross
income or gross receipts. 26 Thus, on the same day as the Tank Truck
16. Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958); Burroughs Bldg.

Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).

17. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). The case is concerned with a penalty deduction; however, the Court does address itself to expenses illegal per se. Id. at 35.
18. However, everyday expenses such as rent and wages, even though paid in
violation of state law, are deductible under the rule of Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356
U.S. 27 (1958). See text accompanying note 27 infra.
19. The Court cited Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 43
(1955). 356 U.S. at 35.
20. Tunnel R.R. v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
288 U.S. 604 (1933); Great Northern Ry. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 855 (1930).
21. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) (alternative holding) ; Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
22. Harry Wiedetz, 2 T.C. 1262 (1943).
23. "Deduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been held to frustrate state
policy in severe and direct fashion by reducing the 'sting' of the penalty prescribed
by the statute." Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1958).
24. Compare Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38, 40
(1958) (alternative holding), where the Court stated that even if the taxpayer acted
without willful intent and with all due care, the deduction would severely and directly
frustrate state policy, with Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d
Cir. 1949), which allowed a deduction for damages paid for violating the Emergency
Price Control Act. The court ruled that it would not frustrate the Price Control
Act to allow the deduction of the payment limited to an amount of an innocent overcharge. See Note, 51 COLUM. L. Rgv. 752 (1951).
25. Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931),
overruled in Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), aff'd, 383 U.S.
687 (1966).
26. The Committee report accompanying the 1913 Revenue Act rejected a
proposal to limit losses and deductions to those incurred in a legitimate or lawful
trade. In the Congressional debates, Senator Williams, who was in charge of the bill,
stated "The object of the bill is to tax a man's net income; . . . what he has at the
end of the year after deducting from his receipts, his expenditures or losses." 50
CONG. Rxc. 3849 (1913). This position was reaffirmed in 1951 when Congress rejected
a proposal for disallowing deductions under § 162 for expenses incurred in connection
with illegal wagering. 97 CONG. Ric. 12230-44 (1951). Senator George added that
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Rentals decision, the Court held in Commissioner v. Sullivan27 that payments for rent and employee salaries in the conduct of a gambling establishment (both the payments and the "business" were in violation of state
law) were deductible, since to find otherwise would come close to taxing
the business on the basis of gross receipts, while all other businesses are
taxed on a net income basis.
The application of the frustration doctrine and the net income principle would appear to lead to inconsistent results. That is, if the allowance
of a deduction for fines or penalties paid for violation of a law would
frustrate the law, why would not the allowance of deductions for operation expenses incurred for violating a law equally frustrate the law ?28
In order to reconcile the congressional intent to tax only net income as
well as the presumption against congressional intent to encourage violation of public policy, 29 the Court has laid down a stringent test to determine when an expense which is otherwise "necessary and ordinary" should
be disallowed on public policy grounds. The mere fact that an expense
arises out of, or in connection with, an illegal purpose does not of itself
make it nondeductible, even if allowance of the deduction may arguably
frustrate public policy.30 Rather, the public policy alleged to be frustrated
must be sharply defined and evidenced by some governmental declara32
tion,3 1 and the frustration must be severe and immediate.
The question of whether the deductibility of legal fees would violate
33
public policy was before the Court in Commissioner v. Heininger.
There
the deductions claimed by the taxpayer for legal fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense against an administrative fraud order issued by the
Postmaster General were upheld. The Commissioner argued that to allow
the deduction would be contrary to public policy because the fees were
incurred in an unsuccessful effort to defend activities Congress had condemned, and to permit deduction would tend to subsidize the defense of

the income tax is based on net income, not gross receipts, and the constitutionality
of a gross income tax on gamblers was questioned. Id. at 12244.
In addition, lower courts have allowed deductions for materials purchased in
violation of maximum price regulations established by the Defense Production Act
of 1950, as amended, ch. 275, § 104(i), 65 Stat. 136 (1951), often on the ground that
disallowance is not authorized by statute but primarily on the basis that disallowance
of expenditures which represent cost of goods sold will result in an unconstitutional
tax on gross receipts. See Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952)
(concurring opinion) ; Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076, 1077 (1948). But the court in
Weisman noted that the over-ceiling purchases in that case were made prior to the
1951 amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950 so that § 2105 (a), permitting
disregard of payments made in violation of price regulations in determining costs, was
not before the court nor were its constitutional implications. 197 F.2d at 224 n.1. See
Note, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 111 nn.14 & 15, 115 & n.24, 130-31 & n.105 (1962).
27. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
28. See Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Ordinary and Necessary Business
Expenses, 42 TAXts 808, 821 (1964).
29. 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
30. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
31. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
32. Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
33. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/12

44

Editors: Recent Developments
SPRING

1967]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

699

illegal conduct. The Court rejected this argument and stated that public
policy must be found in express words of the Internal Revenue Code, or
in a sharply defined policy of the law which was violated.34 Until Tellier,
the Commissioner and the courts had refused to extend Heininger to
include litigation fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense of a criminal
charge, but rather had restricted it to situations involving administrative
findings of "guilt" or other government instituted civil proceedings which
are inconclusive as to the "guilt" of the taxpayer.3 5 But in Tellier, the
question of whether or not the Heininger decision should be extended to
legal fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution
was clearly before the Court.
Relying on prior decisions, 36 the Court first ruled that the payments
deducted by the taxpayer were business expenses. The Court reasoned
that since the criminal charges against the respondent originated because
of his business activities, and that the legal fees paid were in defense of
these charges, the fees were incurred in the carrying on of his business
within the meaning of section 162(a).3 7 The Court then concluded that
the legal fees were also "ordinary and necessary" business expenses and
therefore deductible. 38 The Commissioner, however, argued that public
policy prohibited the deduction even though the expenditures were "ordinary and necessary." 3 9 In refuting the Commissioner's reliance on the
frustration of public policy doctrine, the Court reiterated the principle
that the federal income tax is concerned with taxing net income and not
with imposing sanctions for misconduct. The Court reasoned that just
as the tax does not concern itself with the legality of the income that it
34. 320 U.S. at 473-75. See Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax,
12 TAx L. Rxv. 241, 264 (1957).
35. 114 U. PA. L. Rev. 274, 277 (1965), citing Rev. Rul. 62-175, 1962-2 Cum.
BULL. 50. See Commissioner v. Shapiro, 278 F.2d 556 (7th Cir, 1960); Hopkins v.
Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94
(5th Cir. 1956).
36. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) ; Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S.

488 (1940) ; Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145,(1928). Gilmore held that
"the origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred,
rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was 'business' or 'personal' within the meaning of § 162(a)."
37. 383 U.S. at 689.
38. The Court, quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933), and citing
Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93-94 (1952), Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467, 471 (1943), Kornhouser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 152 (1928), and
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4-13-15 (1819), stated that
"necessary" required only that the expense be "appropriate" and "helpful" to the
taxpayer's business, and that the function of the term "ordinary" is to distinguish
between expenses which are currently deductible and capital expenditures which, if
deductible at all, must be amortized over the asset's life expectancy. The legal fees
were classified in the former category and therefore "ordinary" and deductible even
though such a lawsuit may occur only once in the lifetime of a business. 383 U.S.
at 689-90.
39. The Commissioner argued that since the legal fees were the direct result of
violation of three federal criminal statutes, their deductibility must be considered in
light of the public policy embodied in those statutes. In addition, denial of the deduction does not impair the defendant's freedom to select any attorney, but rather allowance of the deduction would subsidize the defendant's legal expense. Brief for Commissioner, pp. 9-10.
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taxes, neither does the Code require that the expenses sought to be deducted arise out of lawful activities. Thus, expenses which fall within
section 162(a) are deductible with a few limited exceptions which have
been found where Congress, by specific legislation, 40 has disallowed them
or where long standing Treasury Regulations have prohibited the deduction. 41 But where Congress is silent, a deduction will be denied only if
its allowance will clearly frustrate public policy. Citing Heininger,42 Lilly
v. Commissioner5 and Tank Truck Rentals, 44 the Court, affirming the
test established by those cases which by its limitations accommodates the
net income rationale, stated that the public policy frustrated must be
sharply defined, evidenced by some governmental declaration and be
45
affected in a severe and immediate manner.
Before Tellier, the- deduction of legal fees incurred in defending a
taxpayer against penalties imposed for illegal activities was disallowed on
the rationale that since: it is against public policy to allow a deduction for
a fine or penalty, it would also frustrate public policy to permit a deduction for the connected legal fees. 46 The weakness of this reasoning is
that the basis for not permitting the deduction of penalties - that is, that
allowance would mitigate their punitive effect - will not support the disallowance of a deduction for legal fees since the fees are not part of the
penalty and therefore their allowance does not mitigate it.47 Accordingly,
the Court in Tellier, after stating that the hiring of counsel to defend a
criminal charge is not proscribed conduct, but rather a constitutional
right, 48 reasoned that to deny the deduction without Congressional warrant 49 would add to the sanction already proscribed by Congress for

criminal offenses, and would impose a penalty measured by the cost of
counsel and the defendants' tax bracket rather than by the seriousness
of the offense or the sentence imposed. 50
40. 383 U.S. at 693. Among the examples of specific legislation denying deduc-

tions, the Court cited the Iwr. Riv. CODE or 1954, § 162(c) (disallowance of deduction for payments to officials. and employees of foreign countries in circumstances
where the payments would be illegal if federal law were applicable) ; § 165 (d) (deduction for wagering losses limited to extent of wagering gains).
41. In Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), and Textile Mills Sec.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), the Court denied deductions for specified
lobbying expenses. The Regulations denying the lobbying expenses, which had been
of long standing, were assumed to be approved by Congress through subsequent
re-enactment of the Code.
42. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
43. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
44. 356 U.S. 30 (1958y.
45. 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966).
46. Note, 13 STAN. L. Rgv. 92, 102 (1960), citing Burroughs Bldg. Material Co.
v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
47. Note, 13 STAN. L. RA. 92 102 (1960).
48. 383 U.S. at 694, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
49. The opinion cites Paul, supra note 10, at 730-31, to the effect that § 162(a)
is not intended to punish taxpayers.
50. 383 U.S. at 695. See Krassner, Can A Deduction for Legal Fees Be Against
Public Policy?, 26 TAXicS 447, 448 (1948) ; McDonald, Deduction for Attorneys' Fees
for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 103 U. PA. L. Rzv. 168, 180 (1954). An argument
against allowing the deductibility of legal fees incurred in defense of a criminal charge,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/12

46

Editors: Recent Developments
SPRING

1967]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The instant case settles the question regarding whether Heininger
was to be restricted to its facts or extended to legal fees incurred in an
unsuccessful criminal defense. The extension of deductibility of legal
fees incurred in an unsuccessful criminal defense is entirely consistent
with Heininger since if it is "ordinary and necessary" to defend against
a civil suit to put one out of business, which was the case in Heininger,
it is equally so where the case is criminal. 5' In addition, since the Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions and
since this right belongs to the convicted as well as to the acquitted, to
disallow the deduction as against public policy would be to say that this
5 2
policy overrides the constitutional recognition of the right to counsel.
Tellier has thus served several functions. It has established that an expense can be "necessary and ordinary" and still be disallowed if the strict
test of the frustration doctrine is met ;53 it has rightfully distinguished fees
from penalties and, by allowing the deductibility of legal fees incurred in
an unsuccessful criminal defense, it has extended the right to counsel
into the tax area.
Harry C. J. Himes
is that to approve the deduction would in effect have the federal government partially
supporting the defense and therefore would be against public policy plus the higher
the defendant's income level the larger the burden shifted to the pubfic. See Brookes,
supra note 34, at 266; 51 COLUM. L. Rzv. 752, 757 (1951).

51. Brookes, supra note 34, at 264.
52. See id. at 267-68; Note, 72 YAIx L.J. 108, 135-36 (1962).
53. In denying a deduction based on public policy, some courts have reasoned

that an expense arising from illegal activity cannot be "necessary" since it is never

necessary to violate the law. See National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v.
Helvering, 89 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Brookes, supra note 34, at 248. In Tank
Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958), the Court, citing Commissioner

v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943), stated that if the deduction would frustrate
the public policy standard then it cannot be necessary. 356 U.S. at 33-34.
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